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Face perception and recognition is an area of much research across infancy, childhood, and 
adulthood.  Unfortunately, there has been a lack of integration across these areas in the past.  As 
such, there is a need for a comprehensive review of this literature.  When examined, a number of 
discrepancies in research findings across these areas can be identified.  The current literature 
review and empirical investigation take a first step in reconciling discrepancies in the literature 
and make suggestions for future investigations to bring together these disparate areas.  Five-year-
old children, eight-year-old children, eleven-year-old children, and adults were tested under 
either incidental or intentional learning conditions for recognition of distinctive and typical own- 
and other-race faces.  No differences were evident between the incidental and intentional 
learning conditions.  However, evidence of a significant distinctiveness effect was found for all 
age groups.  In addition, the cross-race effect was shown to be highly dependent on the 
distinctiveness of the faces.  In fact, there was no evidence of a cross-race effect for the highly 
typical faces, while a reversal of the cross-race effect was found for the highly distinctive faces.  
In other words, for the highly distinctive faces, other-race faces were recognized more accurately 
than own-race faces, a contrast to previous research demonstrating more accurate recognition for 
own-race faces than other-race faces.  The results from the current study suggest that the cross-
race effect is more complex than previously thought and that distinctiveness is a powerful 
influence in face recognition across development.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Face perception and recognition comprise one of the most fundamental skill areas in human 
cognition.  The ability to perceive and recognize faces requires complex processing skills in 
addition to considerable experience with, and knowledge of, facial information (e.g., Collishaw 
& Hole, 2000; de Haan, Humphreys, & Johnson, 2002; Gauthier & Nelson, 2001).  Despite the 
many studies that have been conducted on face perception and recognition, the domains of adult 
cognition, infancy, and childhood research seem to operate independently, with little attempt to 
integrate this research into a unifying theory of face perception.  Theories of adult face 
perception almost never address how infants and children may develop these skills (e.g., 
Valentine, 1991); and developmental theories often address only the specific age group in which 
the researchers are interested (e.g., Carey, 1992; 1996; Nelson, 2001; 2003).  Research within 
each population focuses on specific aspects of face perception and/or recognition and ignores 
other aspects.  For example, during the newborn and early infancy periods, researchers are 
interested in whether individuals are able to recognize a familiar person from their environment, 
such as their mother (e.g., Bushnell, Sai, & Mullin, 1989; Pascalis, de Schonen, Morton, 
Dereulle, & Fabre-Grenet, 1995; Walton, Bower, & Bower, 1992), while research with older 
children and adults focuses on determining how individuals recognize unfamiliar faces (e.g., 
Johnston & Ellis, 1995; Newell, Chiroro, & Valentine, 1999; Tanaka, Kay, Grinnell, Stansfield, 
& Szechter, 1998).  The current paper will integrate these two areas of research.   
More importantly, when two areas of research address similar issues, their results often 
contradict one another or the relations between them are not considered by each other.  This 
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discontinuity is seen most clearly when comparing the infant and child research.  Infancy  
research suggests that infants are developing a number of face recognition skills, such as the 
ability to form prototypes (de Haan, Johnson, Maurer, & Perrett, 2001); categorize gender 
(Newell, Strauss, & Best, 2003); and recognize unfamiliar faces (Pascalis, de Haan, Nelson, & de 
Schonen, 1998).  Research with preschoolers and older children examines similar issues and 
claims that these skill areas are still limited in early childhood and continue to develop 
throughout most of childhood (e.g., Inn, Walden, & Solso, 1993; Wild, Barrett, Spence, O’Toole, 
Cheng, & Brooke, 2000).   For instance, consider infancy research that has suggested infants are 
capable of processing faces in a configural manner in the first year (Cashon & Cohen, 2004; 
Cohen & Cashon, 2001; Thompson, Madrid, Westbrook, & Johnston, 2001).  Research with 
young children does not find evidence of this processing ability until the preschool years or later 
(Schwarzer, 2000).  Numerous other examples exist that similarly illustrate a lack of 
communication between research areas.  Ultimately, the current research will pull together the 
research on the development of face perception and recognition and integrate it with the research 
on adults’ face skills.  The discrepancies in the results of the developmental research will be 
addressed and possible explanations for these discrepancies will be identified. 
A primary issue that has been neglected in almost all research on face perception and 
recognition is the interaction of face processing strategies and the core base of face knowledge.  
Both processing strategies and the core knowledge base have received attention in the research 
on face perception and recognition, but the two have not been considered across different aged 
populations, nor have the relations between these aspects of face perception ever been addressed.   
Research on adult face perception and recognition has examined both face processing strategies 
and the knowledge base of individuals.  The processing strategies that have been studied most 
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thoroughly are configural and featural processing.  As will be reviewed later in the paper, 
configural processing reflects processing of the second-order relations within stimuli, used 
mainly for face processing.  Featural processing is a manner of processing stimuli that involves 
first-order relations within stimuli that is used for most other objects in the world.  Definitions 
for configural and featural processing are neither clear nor unanimous in the area of face 
perception research.  For the purposes of this paper, featural processing will refer to encoding 
and recognition of faces based on one or more individual features, with no reference to the 
relationships among these features.  Configural processing, on the other hand, will refer to 
encoding and recognizing faces with special attention to “the specific spatial relationships among 
the individual facial features” (Schwarzer, 2000).  Research has also shown that adults are 
experts with the faces in their environment.  A demonstration of this expertise is shown in the 
research documenting how adults recognize faces of their own race more accurately than faces of 
another race (e.g., Devine & Malpass, 1985), which suggests that the knowledge base is learned 
from the environment.  Faces from one’s own race are seen frequently and, therefore, the 
knowledge base for these faces is fairly complete.  Faces from another race, however, are 
encountered less frequently and, thus, much less is known about these faces.  The “other-race” 
faces are, thus, hypothesized to be stored in memory according to the values and distributions of 
the individual’s own race and not processed as efficiently, therefore not recalled as accurately.   
The developmental face perception literature, on the other hand, has focused mainly on 
processing strategies and has largely ignored the impact of a growing knowledge base.  Much of 
the research which addresses how infants and children develop face perception and recognition 
skills is concerned with changes in processing strategies.  The developmental literature has 
shown that configural processing develops over the first six to seven years of life, with much 
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variation in findings from different research programs, as will be discussed later in this paper.                         
Carey has proposed a “processing shift” hypothesis in which children use featural processing 
strategies until they reach 7 to 10 years of age, at which time they switch to using more 
advanced, configural processing strategies (Diamond & Carey, 1977; Diamond & Carey, 1986).  
Changes in face processing skills are credited to this switch from featural to configural 
processing strategies.  Although Carey (1996) poses the critical question of what is developing in 
face skills during early childhood, the proposed answers deal with processing changes, 
specifically the featural to configural shift in processing strategies during encoding.   
In contrast to the numerous studies exploring the development of processing strategies in 
infants and children, there are very few studies which examine the growing knowledge base of 
faces.  Valentine (1991, 1999) and colleagues (e.g., Lewis & Johnston, 1999; Newell et al., 1999; 
Rhodes, Byatt, Tremewan, & Kennedy, 1996) have demonstrated evidence of an extensive 
knowledge base of faces and their features in normal adults.  This knowledge base, according to 
Valentine (1991), plays an important role in face perception and recognition.  Experience with 
faces guides an individual’s encoding and subsequent recognition of a face, as the existing 
knowledge base is adjusted to incorporate this newly learned face.  While the developmental 
literature certainly does not deny the existence of a knowledge base or its growth during infancy 
and childhood (e.g., Carey, 1996), the research has failed to examine the role that the 
development of this knowledge plays in face processing during childhood.  Almost all of the 
infancy literature has focused on processing strategies or the development of specific skills, 
while ignoring the knowledge of faces that underlies these skills.  Recently, a limited amount of 
research with children has addressed the role of face knowledge (e.g., Best, Strauss, Newell, 
Costello, & Gastgeb, 2004; Chance, Turner, & Goldstein, 1982; Johnston & Ellis, 1995; Newell, 
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Strauss, Best, & Gastgeb, 2004).  However, most of the research continues to focus on how 
processing    strategies are changing, rather than the growth of the knowledge base.   
Overall, the developmental literature seems to suggest that changes in processing 
strategies are necessary and sufficient to account for the development of face expertise.  For 
instance, Carey (1992, 1996) indicates that the difference between child and adult performance 
in face perception and recognition tasks can be credited solely to differences in processing styles.  
The research has failed to address, however, whether increased knowledge of faces, their average 
values, and distributions plays a role in the development of face expertise.  According to 
Valentine (1991), the way in which an individual stores faces in the face-space framework 
determines how efficiently these faces are recalled.  Therefore, if infants and children are not 
storing faces in the same manner as adults, due to an insufficient knowledge base, their 
performance in face-related tasks will be impaired.  However, children may also be storing faces 
in a completely different manner than adults, which might also account for the differences in 
performance between children and adults.  Future developmental research needs to address the 
knowledge base of infants and children and the manner in which they are storing faces to 
determine the relative influences of processing changes and increases in knowledge base in the 
developmental changes in face perception.   
Another possibility that has not been addressed in the face perception and recognition 
literature is an interaction between a growing knowledge base of faces and changes in processing 
style.  It is conceivable that these two do not develop in isolation from one another, but that a 
change in one influences the other.  For instance, an individual may experience new faces by 
simply adding them to his/her face-space framework until the current method of encoding faces 
is no longer efficient for recognition.  At that point, new processing strategies that are better 
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suited to the demands of the current developmental stage would be adopted.  In concrete terms, 
young infants may process faces featurally, which is more suited to their situation, as very few 
faces need to be recognized.  However, once the infant begins interacting within a wider social 
circle (or needing to remember faces in their wider social circle), s/he may find it difficult to 
effectively recall faces using a featural strategy.  Therefore, this ineffective recognition 
performance may encourage the adoption of new strategies for processing faces (mostly likely 
unconsciously), such as a configural manner of processing.  The literature on face recognition, 
specifically the “face-space” framework, has never addressed differences in processing strategies 
across development, and their role in the encoding, storage, and retrieval of faces. 
The goal of the current research is to integrate the developmental research on face 
perception and recognition with what is known about adult face perception and recognition 
abilities.  This will be done in one specific area of face perception: the developmental course of 
the cross-race effect of face recognition.  The cross-race effect provides a platform to investigate 
important issues in the face perception literature.  The comparison of recognition for same- and 
other-race faces addresses the contribution of both knowledge base and processing strategies, at 
individual time points in development, based on experience and domain-general memory 
development.  The cross-race effect highlights the interaction of knowledge base and processing 
strategies.  Previous research has demonstrated that other-race faces are processed in a featural 
manner at the same point in development when own-race faces are processed configurally.  
Therefore, the amount of experience with the group of faces determines the processing strategies 
utilized.  In addition, the emergence of this effect can be examined across development, as the 
knowledge base of own-race faces increases.  Thus, the following literature review will highlight 
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evidence of changes in processing and knowledge base and discuss how changes in these two 
may interact in development. 
First, the research on adult face skills will be briefly discussed, providing an overview of 
the most relevant issues, followed by a review of the research on face perception and recognition 
development.  These research areas will be integrated into a consistent picture of development, 
addressing discrepancies in the previous research literature.   Finally, this integration will be 
applied to an empirical question; the developmental course of the cross-race effect. The study 
described here will examine the development of the cross-race effect within a unique research 
paradigm designed to elicit a more naturalistic manner of face processing.  Caucasian                         
five-year-old children, eight-year-old children, 11-year-old children and adults will be tested 
under either incidental or intentional learning conditions for recognition of Caucasian (own-race) 
and Asian (other-race) faces within the context of a story.   
 
1.1. Adult Face Recognition 
1.1.1. The uniqueness of faces  
 
Face recognition is one of the most critical human abilities.  The ability to perceive and 
recognize faces is essential for identifying an individual as familiar or not, reading emotional 
expressions, and forming relationships, as well as many other important skills.  Yet face 
recognition is an exceptionally difficult perceptual task.  Faces are very complex stimuli in 
which minor variations have important implications for identity, emotional expression, and even 
gender.  Despite the complexity of the task, adults demonstrate remarkable skills for perceiving 
and recognizing faces (e.g., Bahrick, Bahrick, & Wittlinger, 1975; Levin & Beale, 2000; 
O’Toole, Deffenbacher, Valentine, McKee, Huff, & Abdi, 1998).  For instance, adults are able to 
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recognize faces despite wide variations in pose, lighting, and expression (Newell et al., 1999).  
Also, individuals are able to recognize a face within ½ second, despite the fact that they have 
thousands of faces stored in memory (Carey, 1996).  Bahrick et al. (1975) even showed that 
adults are able to recognize faces of classmates up to 35 years after graduation.  In fact, adults 
perform so well in face recognition tasks that researchers have questioned whether faces are an 
innately “special” category of stimuli (e.g., Farah, Levinson, & Klein, 1995; Kanwisher & 
Moscovitch, 2000).   
 There is a substantial amount of research, both behavioral (e.g. Tanaka & Farah, 1993; 
Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Thompson & Massaro, 1989; Ward, 1989) and neuropsychological 
(Farah et al., 1995; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Kanwisher, Stanley, & Harris, 1999; 
Kanwisher, Tong, & Nakayama, 1998), suggesting that the way we process faces is qualitatively   
different from any other object category.  The behavioral research compares performance on 
object and face recognition tasks.  For instance, studies have examined the degree to which 
individuals rely on configural versus featural processing in objects and faces.  The research 
indicates that adults process faces in a more configural manner, while they process objects in a 
more featural manner (Tanaka & Sengco, 1997).  These effects have been consistently found 
across different paradigms and in different labs (e.g., Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; 
Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Thompson, 1994; Thompson & Massaro, 1989; 
Ward, 1989).  This effect is demonstrated by manipulating configural and/or featural information 
in stimuli and examining the influence it has on performance in face recognition tasks compared 
to object recognition tasks.  Disrupting configural processing by inverting faces and objects, for 
instance, reveals that face recognition is disproportionately impaired in comparison to object 
recognition (e.g., Tanaka & Sengco, 1997).   
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 Neuropsychological research supports the behavioral results in suggesting that the brain 
has a specialized region that processes facial identity (e.g., Farah et al., 1995; Kanwisher et al., 
1997; Kanwisher et al., 1999; Kanwisher et al., 1998).  Neuroimaging studies have consistently 
identified a specific region of the fusiform gyrus as responsible for face recognition, but not 
object recognition.  This area, often called the Fusiform Face Area (FFA), reliably activates 
when individuals are performing face recognition tasks, but shows little to no activation during 
object recognition tasks (Kanwisher et al., 1997). In addition, prosopagnosia (face agnosia) is a 
neurological disorder which results in selective impairment for face recognition.  Extensive 
testing with a small population of prosopagnosics reveals that the brain is damaged in the area of 
the FFA.  Prosopagnosics cannot recognize familiar faces nor learn new faces (Farah et al., 
1995).  Also, the disorder selectively impairs face processing; object recognition appears to be     
near normal (De Renzi, 1986; Farah et al., 1995; Whiteley & Warrington, 1977).  Together, this 
collection of behavioral and neuropsychological research has convinced many researchers that 
face processing is unique. 
 Despite this research literature, other investigators believe that there may be alternative 
explanations for the seeming “uniqueness” of face processing (e.g., Gauthier, Behrmann, & Tarr, 
1999; Gauthier, Williams, Tarr, & Tanaka, 1998).  They posit two related explanations for the 
apparent “specialness” of face recognition.  First, faces may be unique in that all adults are 
experts in their knowledge of faces.  Adults have had extensive, and meaningful, exposure to 
faces since birth.  In order to compare individuals’ face recognition abilities with object 
recognition abilities, it would be necessary to use a category with which participants have also 
had very extensive experience or knowledge.  Thus, individuals would need to possess expertise 
with a particular category of items in order to serve as an appropriate comparison category to 
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faces.  Gauthier and others (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & 
Anderson, 2000) have conducted experiments with individuals who are experts with a particular 
category of objects (e.g., birds, dogs, cars).  The results indicate that experts display similar 
behavioral and neurological effects with their category of expertise as typical adults do with 
faces.  For instance, experts show an inversion effect with their objects of expertise, suggesting 
that experts process their objects of expertise in a more configural manner, similar to the way 
normal adults process faces (Diamond & Carey, 1986).  Also, expert adults show activation in 
the FFA when discriminating their objects of expertise (Gauthier et al., 2000).  The fact that the 
FFA shows activation in fMRI studies with experts, an area that is hypothesized to be specialized 
for face processing, suggests that there are many similarities between face processing and the 
processing of objects (for experts). Indeed, it has been hypothesized that this area of the fusiform                        
gyrus is not specialized for face recognition, but that it is used for all perception and recognition 
tasks that require processing at a level of expertise.  Gauthier and Tarr (1997) trained individuals 
to become experts in perceiving and recognizing an artificial category of objects, which they 
called ‘greebles’.  They (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) demonstrated that novices appear to use featural 
processing strategies with these unfamiliar objects, while experts use more configural strategies. 
Tanaka et al. (1997) found similar results with car, dog, and biological cell experts. It is difficult 
to compare directly face recognition with ‘greeble’, car, dog, or cell recognition performance, 
because even individuals who are experts with ‘greebles’ and natural categories still have had 
significantly more experience with faces.  However, the research with experts suggests that it is 
expertise or experience, not necessarily faces, which may be the critical factor in the 
experimental effects typically found in face research (e.g., inversion effect). 
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Second, the objects used in these studies as comparison stimuli are of a different level of 
categorical specificity than faces.  Face recognition must represent subordinate-level 
categorization, as the differences between faces are very subtle, while sharing the same 
configuration (Tanaka, 2001).  In contrast, most previous studies (e.g., Kanwisher, Chun, 
McDermott, & Ledden, 1996; Kanwisher et al., 1997) have used objects that represent different 
basic-level categories (e.g., dogs, cars, tables).  The differences between basic-level categories 
are less subtle, and do not necessarily share a standard configuration while objects at the 
subordinate-level, such as different German shepherds or faces, all look very similar. Both faces 
and other subordinate-level categories share a basic configuration within a category.  The critical 
differences that distinguish one subordinate-level object from another within the same category 
are the specific values of the features within the standard configuration.  For instance, all faces 
have eyes, nose and mouth in the same configuration, but the exact size and positioning of these 
features is what distinguishes individuals. The similarity between them may force an individual 
to rely on more advanced processing strategies, such as configural processing.  The differences 
between basic-level categories, such as different breeds of dogs, may be distinctive enough to be 
distinguished using a rough featural processing strategy (Diamond & Carey, 1986). Thus, the 
difference between an emphasis on featural processing with objects and configural processing 
with faces found in most previous studies may not be due to the distinction between faces versus 
objects, but instead a result of featural processing with basic-level versus configural processing 
with subordinate-level category stimuli (Gauthier et al., 2000; Tanaka, 2001).  Ultimately, both 
of the above explanations may account for the performance differences between faces and 
objects.  It is likely that not only do the objects need to be drawn from the same subordinate-
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level category, but also that individuals have a significant amount of experience with these 
objects (Diamond & Carey, 1986).   
 The discussion of the “specialness” of face processing continues to be an ongoing debate 
in the literature.  Thus, it remains unclear whether face processing represents a unique ability, or 
whether adult face processing simply represents an area of perceptual expertise.  A third 
alternative, however, is also possible.  It may be that the fusiform gyrus is specialized for the 
very detailed perceptual task of face perception, but that as we gain experience with a particular 
category of objects we begin to recruit the fusiform gyrus, as it is the area of the brain best suited 
to fine-grained perceptual discriminations (Gauthier et al., 2000).  Regardless of whether face 
processing is specialized in the brain, the mechanisms by which individuals perceive and 
recognize faces are critical areas of research, and shall be explored next. 
1.1.2. Face recognition skills 
 
Of particular interest to researchers of face recognition is the manner in which faces are stored in 
memory.  Previous research on face recognition in adults has identified several important 
findings concerning the way adults store faces in memory.  While researchers have attempted to 
explain each of these phenomena in the past, there was no recognition that they may be related or 
derived from common, underlying processes.  A general framework, proposed by Valentine 
(1991), provides a unifying theory of face recognition.  A discussion of how researchers 
independently explained this set of findings will be followed by a description of Valentine’s 
(1991) face-space framework theory and the way in which it allows an integration of these 
findings.   
Research has shown that adults remember distinctive faces more accurately than typical 
faces and that they are faster at identifying typical faces than distinctive faces in a face 
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classification task (e.g., Bartlett, Hurry, & Thorley, 1984; Going & Read, 1974; Light, Kayra-
Stuart, & Hollander, 1979).  Several attempts have been made to explain this phenomenon.  
Light et al. (1979) proposed a two-component theory to explain the distinctiveness effect in 
which specific memories are accessed for distinctive faces whereas similarity to a prototype is 
used for typical faces.  Bartlett et al. (1984), however, suggested that feelings of familiarity are 
responsible for this effect, where the presentation of a typical face results in a greater amount of 
familiarity than the presentation of a distinctive face.  Finally, Valentine and Bruce (1986b) 
proposed a “prototype hypothesis” in which a prototype is extracted from all previously seen 
faces and individual faces are stored based on similarity to the prototype. 
Explanations have also been identified for the other effects found in adult face 
recognition tasks.  Adults have been shown to recognize faces of their own race better than faces 
from another race (Goldstein & Chance, 1980).  Goldstein and Chance (1980) propose that this 
“other-race effect” is due to individuals’ knowledge of the population of faces.  They argue that 
as children develop they become more efficient at using a face schema for face recognition, but 
that with this increasing efficiency, they also become less able to apply it to unusual stimuli (i.e., 
inverted faces), or faces with which they have not had experience (i.e., faces from another race).   
Finally, adults have been shown to have more difficulty recognizing inverted faces than upright 
faces (Valentine, 1988).  Diamond and Carey’s (1986) study of inversion of faces and dogs 
demonstrated that an inversion effect could be found for stimulus categories other than faces as 
long as the individuals possessed expert knowledge with the stimulus class.  Therefore, Diamond 
and Carey (1986) reinforced the idea that knowledge of faces previously experienced in the 
population played a role in face recognition.  Additionally, Goldstein and Chance’s (1980) “face 
schema” theory also accounts for the face inversion effect. 
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Although many of these explanations of the findings in the face recognition research have 
similar assumptions, they were considered in isolation for many years.  Valentine (1991), 
however, proposed an experience-based face-space framework which pulls together all of the 
findings in the face recognition literature under a common theoretical framework.  In this 
framework, faces are stored according to the values of their features.  The framework is proposed 
to be an n-dimensional space representing all possible features of a face including single features 
(such as the nose), configurations (such as eye separation), and possibly outer features (such as 
hairline).  The dimensions of the face-space framework depend upon an individual’s experience 
with faces, although it is an inherent assumption of Valentine’s theory that all of the feature 
distributions are normally distributed.  Therefore, the center of this framework represents the 
central tendency of all the features.  As an individual gains experience with faces, these faces are 
represented in the face-space framework according to the values of their features.  With more 
experience, the distributions become more refined and the central tendencies become more 
accurate.  More typical features (and therefore more typical faces) lie closer to the center of this 
framework.  More atypical, or distinctive, features or faces fall along the outer edges of the 
framework (Valentine, 1991).  Since features (and therefore faces) are assumed to be normally 
distributed, there should be a dense cluster of typical features/faces in the center of the 
framework whereas the distinctive faces should fall in more sparsely populated regions of the 
framework, along the perimeter (See Figure 1).  The development of a face-space framework 
depends on experience and implies knowledge of the range of feature values in the environment.  
Valentine’s theory necessitates that individuals be able to abstract central tendencies and the 
range of values from faces. 
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Figure 1  Face-space framework. 
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This framework can explain many of the previously identified effects of adult face 
perception and recognition.  Research has consistently shown that distinctive faces are easier to 
remember than typical faces (e.g., Johnston & Ellis, 1995; Newell et al., 1999; Valentine, 2001), 
where “distinctiveness” is defined as whether the face would stand out in a crowd (Newell et al., 
1999).  When individuals are presented with both typical and distinctive faces in face recognition 
tasks, they are more likely to remember the distinctive faces (Light et al., 1979; Newell et al., 
1999; Valentine & Bruce, 1986a).  According to the face-space framework, the distinctiveness 
effect occurs because typical faces occupy a denser area of the framework (all lying near the 
center of the face-space).  Distinctive faces, on the other hand, are found along the sparsely 
populated perimeter of the framework.  Because the typical faces lie in a densely populated 
region, a previously seen face is more similar to many other faces, thus less likely to be 
remembered correctly.  Similarly, it is more likely that a previously unseen typical face is falsely 
identified (Johnston & Ellis, 1995; Valentine, 1991). 
Similarly, when faces are made more distinctive, as in a caricature, adults remember them 
quite accurately and recognize them very quickly (Rhodes, Brennan, & Carey, 1987). Caricatures 
are created by comparing the original face to an average face and then exaggerating those 
features of the original face that are most different from the norm (Byatt & Rhodes, 1998).  
Therefore, caricatures essentially make a face more distinctive than it was in its veridical form.  
Research demonstrates that adults are even able to remember caricatures more accurately than 
their veridical depiction if the face is familiar (Lewis & Johnston, 1999).  Similar to distinctive 
faces, caricatures are remembered more easily because they fall in a more sparsely populated 
region of face-space. 
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The structure of the face-space framework relies on an individual’s experiences with 
faces in the world.  This explains why individuals tend to remember faces of their own race, 
which are highly experienced, better than faces of other, unexperienced races (Devine & 
Malpass, 1985; Goldstein & Chance, 1980; MacLin & Malpass, 2001).  The faces which 
individuals have experienced in their world are those that determine the structure of their face-
space framework.  Therefore, if individuals have had limited experience with a particular race of 
faces, their face-space framework will not be configured to accurately encode these faces 
(Valentine, 1991).  When participants are familiarized with faces from both their own racial 
group and another racial group they subsequently demonstrate better recognition for faces from 
their own race (e.g., Devine & Malpass, 1985; Goldstein & Chance, 1980).  It is assumed that for 
most racial groups, experience with other-race faces is minimal.  Individuals tend to have a well-
defined face-space for discriminating those faces with which they have the most experience.  
Faces experienced in the world are encoded according to the dimensions of each individual’s 
face-space.  Therefore, other-race faces are likely to be encoded according to a system that is 
best suited to the feature distributions of one’s own race.  Without having a detailed 
representation of other-race faces and knowledge of the feature distributions of these faces, they 
tend to get lumped very closely together on the outer perimeter of the framework (Valentine, 
1991; see Figure 2).  When asked to recognize one of these faces, individuals have difficulty 
because of the high density of faces in the region in which they are stored. 
 Another aspect of face processing related to the “face-space” is the discrimination of 
gender.  Adults are very good at classifying the gender of faces, and they do so very quickly 
(O’Toole et al., 1998).  The discrimination of facial gender is based on a very fine-grained 
discrimination of the features that are maximally distinctive between males and females.  These 
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features include nose length, chin width, and eye to eyebrow distance (Brown & Perrett, 1993; 
Chronicle et al., 1995; Yamaguchi, Hirukawa, & Kanazawa, 1995).  Not only are adults very 
good at classifying gender, they are also quicker to identify the gender of a face if that face has 
been rated as being very typical of its gender.  For instance, a male face that has been rated by 
adults as being very masculine is classified as a male in a gender identification task significantly 
faster than a male face that has been rated as being somewhat less masculine (O’Toole et al., 
1998).  This typicality effect may also be explained according to the face-space framework.  
O’Toole et al. (1998) speculated that individuals may store faces according to gender-specific  
 
                   
                  
 
Figure 2  Representation of own-race and other-race faces in the world.   
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prototypes.  It is possible that faces are stored in two different frameworks based on gender.  If 
faces are stored based on gender-specific prototypes, then the distance from the prototype is 
indicative of how masculine/feminine a face is.  Hence, faces that are more gender-typical are 
closer to the prototype and more quickly classified. 
Finally, one of the most surprising findings in the face perception literature is the 
agreement across individuals and cultures in ratings of facial attractiveness (e.g., Berscheid, 
Dion, Walster, & Walster, 1971; Reis, Nezlek, & Wheeler, 1980).  Despite intuitive beliefs that 
attractiveness is determined solely by personal preferences or cultural standards, it appears that 
attractiveness is also based on the “averageness” of faces (Langlois & Roggmann, 1990; 
Rubenstein, Kalakanis, & Langlois, 1999).  Faces which have been artificially created by 
morphing multiple faces together to create an average face are rated by adults as more attractive 
than the individual faces which have created them (Langlois & Roggmann, 1990).  Therefore, 
attractive faces are also the most average faces.  Langlois and colleagues suggest that the 
agreement among adults in ratings of facial attractiveness indicates that adults have advanced 
knowledge of the average values of facial features.  According to the face-space framework 
theory, attractive faces, being more typical, will be found close to the center of the framework.  
These faces are preferred because they represent the more average faces in the population 
(Rubenstein et al., 1999).  Previous research with other perceptual categories such as colors 
(Martindale & Moore, 1988), objects (Whitfield & Slatter, 1979), and musical categories (Smith 
& Melara, 1990) also demonstrates a preference for the prototype of the category, more so than 
the less typical category members. 
In summary, Valentine’s face-space framework theory, a prevailing theory of face 
recognition, has helped guide a substantial amount of research investigating the face perception 
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and recognition skills of adults (Byatt & Rhodes, 1998; Devine & Malpass, 1985; Johnston & 
Ellis, 1995; MacLin & Malpass, 2001; Newell et al., 1999; O’Toole et al., 1998).  Overall, the 
face-space framework theory serves to explain many face recognition effects and integrate them 
into a collective theory.  However, the processing strategies used in face recognition (e.g., 
configural vs. featural) and the development of this framework during infancy and childhood 
have not been addressed by the theory.  As reviewed above, the recognition advantage for 
distinctive faces, other-race faces, and caricatures, the typicality advantage in gender 
classification tasks, and the preference for attractive faces are all hypothesized to be the result of 
the manner in which normal adults store faces.  While our knowledge of face processing during 
adulthood is far from complete, a substantial foundation of research has been built thus far.  It 
has been shown that face perception is based on experience and knowledge of the features of 
faces and that adults process faces in a more configural manner.  Unfortunately, much less is 
known about the development of face expertise. 
 
1.2. Development of face perception skills 
The manner in which infants and children develop the ability to perceive and recognize faces 
provides insight into adults’ processing and storage mechanisms.  The developmental literature 
reveals evidence of processing changes throughout infancy and childhood and evidence of 
increasing knowledge of faces.  This evidence will be presented in a chronological manner, 
charting the development of face expertise from the newborn period through childhood. 
1.2.1. Infant Face Recognition 
 
A significant amount of research has been devoted to tracking the development of face 
perception from birth.  The infant research spans age ranges from infants who are only hours old 
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up to about 18 months.  Unfortunately, the research with newborn infants is often disconnected 
from the research with older infants and these two research areas have produced some disparate 
results that contradict each other.  These disparate results will be addressed in this section. 
1.2.1.1.  Face perception by newborns.  The research with newborns indicates that, at birth, 
infants possess basic face perception skills that help to guide their future knowledge of faces.  
The early experience of newborns may be critical for building a foundation of face knowledge.  
For instance, newborns are attracted to faces from hours after birth (Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; 
Johnson & Morton, 1991).  Visual tracking procedures present newborns with stimuli of varied 
amount of similarity to faces.  These stimuli are slowly moved to one side and investigators 
measure how far infants will turn their heads to continue viewing the stimulus.  Newborns track 
a face stimulus further than any other stimulus (Goren et al., 1975).  However, it is unclear 
whether this preference is specific to faces, or whether it is due to the relative complexity of 
faces in comparison to the other stimuli presented.  Easterbrook, Kisilevsky, Hains, and Muir 
(1999) indicated that infants are tracking faces based on their degree of complexity relative to 
other stimuli.  Easterbrook et al. (1999) suggests that when infant vision is analyzed with a linear 
systems model, the spatial frequencies of a face are well suited to the newborn’s visual 
capacities.  Thus, their preferences are due to the appropriateness of the face as a stimulus, not 
“faceness” itself.  It has been suggested that the newborn’s visual preferences are dictated by a 
subcortical system that Morton and Johnson (1991) called CONSPEC.  This is proposed to be an 
innate system which guides infants’ attention to faces based on the basic stimulus properties of 
faces, and as such provides a basis for future learning.  While under the influence of CONSPEC, 
infants are thought to be paying attention to faces without conscious control.  It is through this 
experience that infants may learn the importance of faces and some basic knowledge of faces and 
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their variations in the world.  It is not until approximately six weeks of age that a cortical system, 
CONLERN, takes over the processing of faces.  CONLERN uses conscious mechanisms to learn 
about faces (Morton & Johnson, 1991).  Thus, it is clear that infants are attracted to faces from 
very early, possibly influenced by CONSPEC, but research has not determined the specific 
properties that attract infants’ attention, whether it be specific to faces or some property of faces, 
such as complexity. 
Another basic face perception skill that newborns demonstrate is the ability to recognize 
their mother’s face within hours after birth, even when olfactory cues have been masked 
(Bushnell et al., 1989; Field, Cohen, Garcia, & Greenberg, 1984).  Newborn vision is limited, 
however, to large and high contrast information (e.g., Kellman & Banks, 1998).  Thus, 
recognition of the mother is probably based on features such as the outer contours of the face and 
the head shape.  These are the features that newborns scan most consistently (Maurer, 1985).  
When these features are occluded, it is not until one month later that infants are able to recognize 
their mother (de Haan et al., 2001; Pascalis et al., 1998; Pascalis et al., 1995). 
In contrast to the research demonstrating newborns’ limited face perception skills, an 
alternative line of research claims that even newborns demonstrate a preference for attractive 
faces (e.g., Slater, Quinn, Hayes, & Brown, 2000; Slater et al., 1998).  When newborns are 
presented with pairs of faces in which one face has been rated by adults to be attractive and the 
other has been rated as unattractive, newborns will look longer at the attractive face (Slater et al., 
2000; Slater et al., 1998).  While research suggests that infants and adults prefer attractive faces, 
this preference is assumed to be the result of a preference for faces that are most representative, 
or “average,” for the population.  In order to prefer a face based on its “averageness”, one must 
know what is considered average for faces.  Therefore, a preference for attractive faces that is 
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based on typicality requires an individual to have formed a prototype of faces or to have at least a 
rudimentary face-space framework.  However, newborns likely have not had enough experience 
with faces to have formed a prototype.  In fact, the ability to abstract a prototype from a series of 
faces may not develop until at least three months of age (de Haan et al., 2001).  Also, Langlois, 
Ritter, Roggmann, & Vaughn (1991) argue that a preference for attractive faces does not develop 
until six months of age.  Thus, this early preference for attractive faces must be driven by some 
other mechanism not based on averageness or the ability to abstract prototypes.  For instance, it 
is possible that this early preference for attractive faces is not driven by experience or 
knowledge, but by some other properties of attractive faces such as symmetry (e.g., Bornstein, 
Ferdinandsen, & Gross, 1981; Fisher, Ferdinandsen, & Bornstein, 1981) It is not yet clear, 
however, what mechanism accounts for this preference.   
Overall, the face skills of newborns are limited by many factors.  Most importantly, many 
difficult face perception tasks require perceptual skills that are beyond those available to 
newborns.  For example, research on newborns’ perceptual abilities has shown that infants 
cannot see fine details such as internal facial features.  Also, eye-tracking studies have indicated 
that infants are not consistently scanning the internal features of faces until four months of age 
(Maurer, 1985).  Finally, newborns have had very little experience with faces.  Even if infants 
are born with multiple innate face perception skills, the advanced skills that older infants, 
children and adults possess require very extensive experience with a wide variety of faces.  
Therefore, newborns’ face perception skills are impressive when taking these factors into 
consideration, yet quite narrow when considering all that still has to be learned.  
1.2.1.2.  Face perception by older infants.  Infant research has demonstrated an emerging 
expertise with faces which begins from birth.  Although face knowledge continues to develop 
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well into childhood, the first year of experience with faces seems to be a period of rapid 
development, where infants are developing a strong foundation of face knowledge.  By the end 
of the first year, infants are able to remember faces over an extended period of time (Fagan, 
1973), abstract prototypes (de Haan et al., 2001), prefer attractive faces (Langlois et al., 1991), 
categorize gender (Newell & Strauss, 2002), and process faces configurally (Thompson et al., 
2001).  Each of these skills indicates vast experience with faces, knowledge of the average 
values and distributions of features, and advances in the processing of faces.  These advances in 
knowledge and processing skills will be demonstrated in the following review of research with 
infants.   
One of the most fundamental face perception skills is the ability to remember a face 
based on the internal facial features.  Although newborns are able to remember a face based on 
external cues such as head shape (e.g., Bushnell et al., 1989), internal cues are more important 
for reliable face recognition because they are less vulnerable to change and represent the most 
detailed information in the face.  As mentioned above, the ability to remember the internal 
features of a specific face for a short period of time develops as early as 1 month of age (de Haan 
et al., 2001).  At this age, however, the memory is volatile and cannot be retained for a 
significant period of time.  Fagan (1973) demonstrated that retention of a face in memory for a 
longer period develops by 6 months of age.  While it is unclear what develops between one and 
six months that leads to advances in memory for specific faces, it is likely that the development 
involves changes in both processing and the structure of the face-space framework.   
While researchers are still debating the specific nature of the face-space framework, it 
seems necessary for individuals to be able to compare faces across time, remember specific 
faces, and form categories of faces.  Prototype formation necessitates each of these abilities.  
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Therefore, the emergence of the ability to form a prototype of faces indicates that infants are now 
able to accomplish each of these tasks.  Hence, once the ability to abstract prototypes of faces 
emerges, infants should be able to begin forming a face-space framework.  Although, Strauss 
(1979) demonstrated that infants are able to abstract a prototype from a series of faces at 10 
months, a more recent study by de Haan et al. (2001) extended this ability to three-month-old 
infants.  de Haan et al. (2001) explored the ability of one- and three-month-old infants to 
remember specific faces and to form prototypes of faces.  Infants were presented with four 
successive faces during the familiarization period.  During the test trials, infants were first 
presented with the prototype of the four familiarization faces paired with one of the 
familiarization faces.  Preference for the familiar face indicates that infants find the prototype to 
be more familiar than a previously seen face, verification of prototype formation.  Only the 
three-month-old infants demonstrated this preference.  The infants were also presented with one 
of the four familiarization faces paired with a novel face to determine whether the infants were 
able to remember a specific face from the series.  Both the one- and three-month-old infants 
demonstrated memory for a specific face by displaying a preference for the novel face.  
Therefore, this study revealed that the ability to form a prototype from a series of faces develops 
between one and three months (de Haan et al., 2001).  Thus, by three months of age infants are 
beginning to learn the values of the faces they experience, abstract typicality distributions from 
this experience, and form a rudimentary face-space framework. 
Closely related to the ability to form prototypes of faces is the preference for attractive 
faces.  As noted previously, adults’ ratings of facial attractiveness are based on the “averageness” 
of faces (Langlois & Roggman, 1990).  In order to identify an attractive, or average face, one 
must first be able to abstract averages and typicality distributions from faces.  Therefore, once 
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the ability to abstract prototypes emerges, infants should also demonstrate knowledge of 
attractiveness.  Langlois and colleagues (Langlois et al., 1991; Langlois & Roggman, 1990; 
Langlois, Roggman, Casey, Ritter, Rieser-Danner, & Jenkins, 1987) have conducted a series of 
experiments showing that, by six months of age, infants prefer those faces that adults have rated 
as attractive.  Since infants have been shown to be able to abstract prototypes by three months, it 
is reasonable to expect infants to demonstrate a preference for attractive faces by six months.  
This research has demonstrated that six-month-old infants prefer attractiveness across a variety 
of different faces, including both genders and multiple races (Langlois et al., 1991).   
As infants begin to gain knowledge of faces and form a more detailed face-space 
framework, other skills begin to come online.  For instance, the ability to categorize gender using 
the internal features of faces is an advanced skill based on the discrimination of subtle details of 
faces, comparisons across faces, and the use of face prototypes.  Quinn, Yahr, Kuhn, Slater, and 
Pascalis (2002) investigated the ability to categorize gender with three- to four-month-old 
infants.  While infants familiarized with male faces demonstrated a novelty preference during 
test trials, infants familiarized to female faces did not show a novelty preference.  Further 
investigations revealed that this novelty preference is derived from a preference for female faces 
generally.  In fact, the preference for female faces reverses to a preference for male faces for 
infants whose primary caregiver is male.  Therefore, this set of results suggests that early gender 
categorization is based on similarity to the primary caregiver.  More importantly, these studies 
demonstrate the critical role that experience plays in the development of face expertise. 
As described previously, adults demonstrate a typicality effect in gender categorization, 
in which more typical faces are categorized more quickly than less typical faces (O’Toole et al., 
1998).  The gender-related typicality of a face is determined by its distance in face-space from a 
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gender-specific prototype.  A recent study by Newell and Strauss (2002) indicated that 
categorization of gender in infancy emerges in relation to the development of the face-space 
framework.  Five- and eight-month old infants were habituated to either male or female faces 
showing only the internal facial features in an infant-controlled habituation paradigm.  The eight-
month-old infants were able to categorize gender, but only with the most typical faces (i.e., very 
masculine or feminine faces; Newell & Strauss, 2002).  A follow-up study extended the ability to 
categorize typical faces to six-month-old infants.  However, even 11-month-old infants were 
unable to categorize gender when the faces were less typical (Newell et al., 2003).  Therefore, 
when infants first begin to categorize gender, they can do so with only the most typical faces.  
This typicality effect is likely a reflection of the sampling of faces in the world of the infant.  
Infants are likely to have greater experience with more typical faces than less typical faces, and 
thus, develop gender categorization abilities with the most typical faces first.  Typical faces are 
also the easiest to categorize based on the relative differences between the faces.  For example, if 
you consider facial gender to be a continuum from masculine to feminine, then the most gender-
typical (i.e., very masculine/feminine) faces will fall at the edges of the continuum and the less 
gender-typical (i.e., gender-ambiguous) faces will fall in the middle, where the two genders 
overlap (Figure 3).  Thus, it is harder to classify the gender of these faces.  The existence of a 
typicality effect in gender categorization during infancy supports the notion that infants are 
processing faces in a manner similar to adults and not categorizing gender on the basis of one or 
two features of the face. 
Although adults are best able to process faces when presented in an upright orientation, 
very young infants do not show the same advantage for upright faces as adults do.  Researchers 
have speculated that faces which are presented in an inverted orientation are not processed 
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Figure 3  The distribution of male and female faces in the world.   
 
 
configurally and, as such, are not remembered as well as upright faces.  Inversion of faces is 
assumed to disrupt configural processing, driving a more featural method of processing faces 
(Bartlett & Searcy, 1993).  This phenomenon has been credited more recently to the relative 
amount of experience that individuals have with upright versus inverted faces (Cashon & Cohen, 
2004).  It is well known that most of the face perception skills of adults are based on experience 
with faces.  This experience is primarily with upright faces.  Therefore, face perception skills for 
inverted faces do not develop.  Young infants (less than 5-7 months of age), however, are equally 
good at recognizing both upright and inverted faces. One possible explanation for the difference 
between infants and adults is that infancy is the only time during development that individuals 
have a significant amount of experience with inverted faces (and all other orientations).  Until 
infants are able to sit upright, they experience faces in every orientation.  Therefore, it is possible 
that infants learn how to recognize faces in all positions (Cashon & Cohen, 2004).  An 
alternative possibility is that infants are not equally good at recognizing upright and inverted 
faces, but that they are equally poor at recognizing upright and inverted faces.  Infant face 
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recognition performance is typically compared to chance performance, while adult performance 
is compared between conditions (i.e., upright vs. inverted).  Therefore, adults are able to 
remember inverted faces at better than chance performance, but the performance with upright 
faces is significantly better than with inverted faces.  Infants, on the other hand, are only able to 
remember both conditions better than chance; recognition of upright faces is not developed well 
enough to be significantly better than inverted faces.  Whichever explanation best fits, a 
significant advantage for upright faces is not found until around seven months of age (Cashon & 
Cohen, 2004).  Further support for the notion that by seven months infants are using configural 
face processing strategies is shown by Thompson et al. (2001), which demonstrated that seven-
month-old infants attend to the configurations among features when comparing facial stimuli in 
which the features remained the same but the configurations among the features differed.   
After reviewing the literature on infant face perception, it becomes obvious that infants 
are developing a number of important face skills during their first year of life.  However, many 
skills have not fully developed (i.e., to adult-level).  By comparing the infants’ face perception 
skills to those of adults, it seems that infants have formed the basis of many foundational skills, 
but have not yet shown evidence of more advanced skills that require significantly more 
experience with faces. 
A number of indicators of face expertise were identified in the review of adult face 
perception.  Some of these skills have developed by the end of the first year, indicating a 
development of face expertise.  Specifically, infants are able to form prototypes of faces (de 
Haan et al., 2001), prefer attractive faces (Langlois et al., 1991), process faces configurally 
(Cashon & Cohen, 2004) and categorize gender (Newell & Strauss, 2002).  However, many 
skills have not yet developed.  The recognition advantage for distinctive versus typical faces has 
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only been investigated in one infant study.  Preliminary data (Best et al., 2003) suggested that the 
recognition advantage is only evident in nine- and ten-month-old infants when recognition for 
very distinctive faces is examined.  Sangrigoli and de Schonen (2004b) have shown that three-
month-old infants recognize a single Caucasian face better than a single Asiatic face, but the 
effect disappears when familiarized with a series of three faces.  Thus, there is limited evidence 
for the cross-race effect in infancy and it is dependent on experiences in the lab.  The recognition 
advantage for caricatures has not even been studied yet.  While there is little evidence of whether 
these skills develop during infancy, it is likely that these skills require years of experience with 
faces to develop.  Therefore, more substantial evidence of these skills may not be found until the 
toddler or preschool years, as is true of gender categorization of less typical faces.  Overall, there 
are a number of aspects of the face-space framework that seem to develop during infancy and 
childhood.  While many skills are beginning to develop during infancy, the development of face 
expertise must continue to develop beyond infancy. 
1.2.2. Child face perception 
 
Although infants are developing a number of face skills during infancy, there is still much to be 
learned when individuals depart from the infancy period.  By the time infants have reached the 
end of their first year, they are able to form prototypes of faces, recognize a face over an 
extended time, discriminate male versus female faces, and prefer attractive faces.  What is left to 
be learned in childhood?  Not only have some skills and face perception effects not yet reached 
adult-level, many others have not yet shown the beginnings of development.  It is during 
childhood that most of the finishing touches are put on face perception skills and the more 
advanced skills of face expertise develop.   
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 The following section will review the literature on children aged 2-13 years.  Although 
research has examined face perception/recognition skills with children, little work has been 
conducted with toddlers and preschoolers.  The few studies that have been conducted with young 
children indicate that this is a very important period in the development of face perception 
abilities.  As with the review of the infancy literature, each of these important skills of facial 
expertise will be discussed in turn.  
1.2.2.1. Face perception during the toddler and preschool years. Although many skills 
show rudimentary beginnings during infancy, these skills continue to show improvement 
throughout childhood until they reach adult-level.  de Haan et al. (2001) demonstrated that 
infants as young as 3 months old are able to form prototypes from a series of faces, and treat the 
prototype as more familiar than one of the original faces from the familiarization series.  
However, Inn et al. (1993) indicate that the ability to form prototypes continues to develop 
through age six.  Inn et al. (1993) examined the abilities of children aged three to six years old to 
form prototypes of a series of faces.  Though all age groups viewed the prototype as familiar, the 
false alarm rate increased significantly with age.  These results suggest that prototype formation 
abilities are continuing to develop from infancy through childhood.  No study has yet determined 
when the ability to form a prototype reaches a performance level comparable to adults, although 
Inn et al. (1993) suggests that it is later than age six.  This study reveals a developmental pattern 
that is seen consistently in many of the studies of face perception abilities in children; the 
foundations for skills are laid during infancy, but it is not until later in childhood that these skills 
are fully developed. 
Another example of a face perception skill that continues to show improvement through 
childhood is gender categorization.  As previously described, gender categorization begins to 
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develop in infancy, but has not fully developed by the end of the first year.  A study by Newell et 
al. (2004) with three- and four-year-old children has demonstrated that preschool children are 
able to categorize reliably the gender of both more and less typical faces.  However, none of the 
children were able to categorize the faces with 100% accuracy, as adults are.  In fact, accuracy 
levels ranged from 58% – 88%, depending on the typicality of the faces and whether hair was 
presented as a cue.  The result indicated that both typicality and hair facilitated gender 
categorization.  The typical faces which included hair were categorized most accurately, while 
the less typical faces with the hair occluded were recognized least accurately.  The accuracy with 
typical faces with the hair occluded and the less typical faces with the hair included fell in 
between these extremes and were not significantly different from one another.  The results from 
both infants and preschoolers show a clear pattern of increasing expertise.  Individuals are 
gaining experience with faces, learning the values of their features, and understanding the 
differences between these features.  The progression from categorizing only the most typical 
faces (i.e., during infancy) to inconsistently categorizing both more and less typical faces (i.e., 
during the preschool years) to consistently categorizing all faces (i.e., in adulthood) presents a 
clear picture of the development of facial expertise (Newell & Strauss, 2002; Newell et al., 
2003).  The development of gender categorization with the full range of faces in the world 
requires years of experience with faces and a well-developed face-space framework. 
 A similar pattern of development is seen in the memory advantage for distinctive faces.  
As mentioned above, adults demonstrate better memory for faces which have been rated as more 
distinctive than faces which have been rated as less distinctive (i.e., typical; Light et al., 1979).  
Preliminary data from our lab suggest that nine- to ten-month-old infants do not display a 
memory advantage for distinctive faces.  A small effect seems to appear, but it is highly 
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dependent on the level of distinctiveness of the faces (Best et al., 2003).  However, preliminary 
data from a follow-up investigation with three- and four-year old preschoolers suggests a reliable 
recognition advantage for distinctive faces.  This study presents six faces in an incidental 
learning phase and probes memory for each of these faces in a forced-choice task.  This 
paradigm makes the task as easy as possible for the children by making the task more 
naturalistic.  Also, the forced-choice test phase allows children to actively compare the novel and 
familiar faces. Overall, preschoolers showed better memory for the distinctive faces than the 
typical faces (Best et al., 2003).        
 If configural processing indicates advanced knowledge of faces, then it is likely an 
important area for exploring the development of face expertise.  Much of the research with 
children indicates that the ability to process faces configurally does not develop until well into 
childhood, despite the research of Cashon and Cohen (2004), which suggests that configural 
processing is evident in seven-month-old infants.  For instance, Schwarzer (2002) examined 
analytic and holistic processing in two- through five-year-old children.  He found that all age 
groups processed faces using a single feature when presented in a task that allows them to choose 
their mode of processing, where analytic and holistic options are in competition.  However, this 
study does not address whether configural processing abilities are present in two- though five-
year-old children, it only suggests that they prefer to use featural strategies when they are 
available.   
Another study examining configural processing in preschool children (Brace, Hole, 
Kemp, Pike, Van Duuren, & Norgate, 2001) revealed that two- to four-year-old children show an 
“inverted inversion effect” with faces.  Preschool children showed faster reaction times to 
inverted faces than upright faces.  While this effect seems to contradict the idea that children are 
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processing faces configurally, a closer inspection of the data may reveal a different story.  If the 
reaction times between upright and inverted faces were identical, it would indicate that these 
children are processing both orientations featurally.  However, the significant difference between 
upright and inverted faces seems to indicate that preschool children are processing the two 
orientations in a different manner.  Perhaps children are processing the upright faces 
configurally, but this strategy is not yet as efficient as the featural strategy, so that it requires 
more time and effort.  This explanation can account for the data.  In addition, the accuracy data 
reveals no difference for the orientations, so the children may be able to use the configural 
strategy successfully, just not as quickly.   
 Overall, there are very few studies that investigate face expertise with toddlers and 
preschoolers, despite the current research that suggests the skills which are present in infancy 
undergo important development during this time.  The research conducted thus far indicates that 
this is a critical time period to examine; skills which are beginning to develop in infancy are 
almost at adult-level by childhood.  Thus, important development must occur during the toddler 
and preschool years and is being missed by not conducting research with this age group.  
Practically speaking, it may be more difficult to recruit and test this age group, which may be 
why this population has been neglected in research.  Compared to the infancy research, this 
research area suggests that some of the rudimentary skills are becoming more sophisticated 
during this time and also the recognition advantage for distinctive faces seems to be emerging 
during this time.  As with infants, the recognition advantage for caricatures has not yet been 
investigated during this period of development.  
1.2.2.2.  Face perception by older children. During childhood, children are fine-tuning 
their face perception skills to become more adult-like.  More advanced face skills that are 
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indicative of face expertise are also developing during this period of development.  As the 
following section will reveal, the later years of childhood are the period of development in which 
the “final touches” are put on face expertise.  The foundation of facial expertise is in place before 
this time; it is during late childhood that skills are crystallized into their mature level.  For 
example, it is during this time that holistic and configural processing strategies become very 
efficient and the strategies of choice for face processing.  Also, the more advanced skills of face 
expertise are developing, such as the recognition advantage for other-race faces and caricatures. 
Research with older children has shown that the ability to process faces configurally continues to 
develop well into childhood.  Tanaka et al. (1998) employed a part-whole paradigm with 
children aged six through eleven years old.  This paradigm presents faces during a learning 
phase, and then probes memory for a particular feature either in isolation or in the context of a 
whole face.  An individual should be better able to identify a feature in the context of the whole 
face if s/he is processing the face configurally.  Tanaka et al. (1998) showed that children from 
age six through eleven years process faces configurally.  Therefore, by six years of age, children 
are efficient at configural processing in face perception tasks. 
On the other hand, Schwarzer (2000) demonstrated that holistic processing is increasingly 
used by seven- and ten-year-old children.  The paradigm employed by Schwarzer (2000) allows 
participants to choose their mode of processing when analytic and holistic processing are placed 
in competition.  Participants can categorize a group of faces using either a single feature (i.e., 
analytic processing) or the relationship among all the features (i.e., holistic processing).  
Therefore, less advanced processing strategies may be more efficient for younger children and 
thus chosen more often (Schwarzer, 2000).  However, when children are forced to process faces 
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configurally, the evidence shows that they are capable of doing so (Tanaka et al., 1998).  They 
simply become more efficient through development. 
In addition, Johnston and Ellis (1995) showed significantly faster reaction times to 
categorize typical faces than distinctive faces in a face/non-face identification task with five-, 
seven-, nine-, eleven-, and thirteen-year-old children.  However, an explicit task (based on 
recognition accuracy) employed by Johnston and Ellis (1995) revealed that five-year-old 
children did not show a memory advantage for distinctive faces.  The results from Johnston and 
Ellis (1995) seem to contradict those found by Best et al. (2003).  However, as will be discussed 
in a later section, the difference in implicit versus explicit paradigms may help to account for 
these differences.  Implicit paradigms may be better suited than explicit paradigms for revealing 
skills that have not fully developed.  Overall, this collection of results suggests that the memory 
advantage for distinctive faces begins to emerge in infancy but is not fully developed until after 
five years of age.   
Directly related to the distinctiveness effect is the recognition advantage for caricatures.  
Caricatures are remembered as well as, or better, than their veridical depictions because 
caricatures are distinctive by nature.  Only one study has attempted to chart the developmental 
course of the recognition of caricatures (Chang, Levine, & Benson, 2002).  In this report, six-, 
eight-, and ten-year old children and adults were asked to rate five faces of different caricatured 
distortion on whether they were “most like” other faces or “most different” from other faces 
they’ve seen in the world.  Caricatures, created by exaggerating the distinctiveness of faces; 
anticaricatures, created by making faces more average; and the veridical representation of each 
face were shown.  Across all age groups, participants chose the anticaricatures as “most like” 
other faces and the caricatures as “most different” from other faces they’ve seen.  However, the 
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six-year olds showed the smallest distinctiveness effect, while the 10-year olds showed the 
largest distinctiveness effect.  A second experiment by Chang et al. (2002) showed that reaction 
times in an identification task varied by caricature level for all participants (six-, eight-, and ten-
year olds and adults).  Caricatures were identified faster than anticaricatures and the veridical 
depiction.  In addition, veridicals were identified faster than anticaricatures.  On average, both 
children and adults chose a caricature as the best likeness for familiar faces, but an anticaricature 
as the best likeness for unfamiliar faces.  This collection of results carries many important 
suggestions.  First, the results support the notion that children are processing faces similarly to 
adults and using a face-space framework to organize their experiences.  All age groups showed 
similar patterns of results, the effects simply became more pronounced as the children got older.  
Second, participants believed that the caricatures were the best representation of the familiar 
faces in the study, yet anticaricatures were the best representation of the unfamiliar faces.  These 
results imply that very important differences exist between recognition processes for familiar and 
unfamiliar faces.  Individuals seem to represent familiar faces in terms of distinctiveness, but are 
not able to do so with unfamiliar faces.  This discrepancy, however, is rarely considered in the 
literature; most studies examine recognition of unfamiliar faces and assume that it generalizes to 
all the faces in the individual’s environment.  Finally, the ability to recognize caricatured faces as 
a representation of the veridical indicates that children as young as six years old are able to 
recognize the distinctiveness of faces, a fact supported by the work of Johnston and Ellis (1995) 
examining the distinctiveness advantage in face recognition.   
According to the face-space framework, experience with same-race faces leads to the 
advancement of encoding strategies for these faces.  More experience with own-race faces 
develops more extensive distributions of features and more accurate central tendencies for these 
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features.  A limited amount of experience with other-race faces, however, prevents the 
development of aspects of face-space related to this population of faces.  As individuals become 
more proficient at recognizing own-race faces, the skills for other-race faces are not developing.  
Therefore, the developmental picture of the cross-race effect should follow a specific path.  Early 
in development, when individuals do not have extensive experience with any race of faces, face 
recognition performance should be equivalent for all races of faces.  As children gain more 
experience with faces of their own race, and develop more sophisticated face-space frameworks 
based on this experience, recognition performance should improve for own-race faces.  
Assuming a limited amount of experience with other-race faces, recognition performance for 
these faces should not improve with age.  Thus, the difference in recognition accuracy for own-
race and other-race faces should increase throughout development. 
Investigations of the development of the cross-race effect have been limited and 
conflicting.  The results of these few studies do not indicate a coherent developmental picture.  
Feinman and Entwisle (1976), the first study to explore the cross-race effect in children, explored 
the recognition abilities of Caucasian and African-American first-, second-, third-, and sixth-
graders for both Caucasian and African-American faces.  Feinman and Entwisle (1976) found a 
significant cross-race effect at all ages.  In other words, Caucasian children more accurately 
recognized Caucasian faces while African-American children more accurately recognized 
African-American faces.  More interestingly, children who had more contact with the other race 
displayed a smaller cross-race effect than children who were determined to have had little or no 
experience with the other race.  Thus, this study clearly demonstrates the role of experience in 
the development of the cross-race effect.   
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 The results of this initial investigation seem to clearly indicate that children demonstrate 
a cross-race effect by first grade.  However, subsequent investigations by Chance, Turner, and 
Goldstein (1982) and Goldstein and Chance (1980) found conflicting results.  Goldstein and 
Chance (1980) investigated the ability of Caucasian children in first through sixth grade to 
recognize Caucasian and Japanese faces.  Children were familiarized with 10 faces of each race 
and tested with these 10 target faces and 20 distractor faces, with each race being tested on 
separate days.  The results indicated that although recognition accuracy improved with age, there 
was no difference in accuracy between Caucasian and Japanese faces for all children.  An adult 
comparison group did demonstrate the expected effect however, dispelling concerns about the 
particular stimuli used or the methodology. 
 Chance et al. (1982) conducted a follow-up study which extended the age range to 
include seventh- and eighth-graders in order to further explore when the cross-race effect might 
develop.  This investigation included first- and second-graders, fifth- and sixth-graders, seventh- 
and eighth-graders, and adults.  Again, all subjects were Caucasian and were tested separately on 
their ability to recognize Caucasian and Japanese faces.  Individuals were familiarized with 16 
target faces and tested with a total of 64 faces, targets and distractors.  Similar to the Goldstein 
and Chance (1980) study, overall recognition accuracy improved across ages.  The Age x Race 
interaction was significant, with only the youngest age group (first- and second-graders) not 
recognizing Caucasian faces more accurately than Japanese faces.  This follow-up study suggests 
that the cross-race effect develops between second and fifth grade.  The increase in the number 
of familiarization and test trials from the original study seems to have made the task difficult 
enough to demonstrate a cross-race effect. 
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 A more recent study which explored the development of the cross-race effect was 
conducted by Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, and Moore (2003).  This investigation explored the cross-
race effect with Caucasian and African-American kindergarteners, third-graders, and adults.  
Pezdek et al. (2003) familiarized participants with a video of two men, one Caucasian and one 
African-American.  Participants were tested for recognition 24 hours later.  The target faces were 
presented in two race-specific line-ups, each with five distractor faces.  As with the previous 
studies, recognition accuracy was found to increase with age, regardless of the race of the faces.  
In addition, the cross-race effect was found at all ages, and age did not interact with this effect.  
Therefore, the cross-race effect seems to be evident by five years of age according to Pezdek et 
al. (2003).   
 In support of the Pezdek et al. (2003) findings, Sangrigoli and de Schonen (2004a) also 
demonstrated the development of the cross-race effect at five years of age.  Sangrigoli and de 
Schonen (2004a) employed a forced-choice task in which 3- to 5-year-old children were briefly 
presented with a face and asked to identify it after a 1000 ms delay when paired with an 
unfamiliar face.  In this study, only the 5-year-old children displayed the cross-race effect, with 
Caucasian faces being recognized more accurately than Asian faces.  The 3- and 4-year-old 
children recognized both Caucasian and Asian faces with equal accuracy. 
Together, the developmental cross-race literature suggests that this effect arises between 
five and twelve years of age.  The difficulty of the task (e.g., the number of faces, whether the 
task is discrimination or recognition) seems to be a factor in determining when the effect is 
evident.  The findings reported on the development of the cross-race effect are consistent with 
that from the other indicators of expertise (i.e., distinctiveness effect, caricature advantage) 
showing a prolonged developmental period for the more advanced skills of face expertise. 
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Overall, the research with older children highlights a period of increasing expertise.  
Many face perception/recognition skills are already developed, but are being fine-tuned during 
this time.  For instance, configural and/or holistic processing strategies are becoming more 
efficient and being used more frequently during this time (Schwarzer, 2000; Tanaka et al., 1998).  
Also, the recognition advantage for distinctive faces shows increasing strength in 5- through 13-
year-old children (Johnston & Ellis, 1995).  In addition, other indicators of face expertise are just 
beginning to develop during childhood.  The cross-race effect of face recognition seems to be 
developing between seven and ten years of age (Chance et al., 1982) and the recognition of 
caricatures is present by six years of age (Chang et al., 2002).  By childhood, the face-space 
framework seems to be fairly advanced.  Children have an advanced knowledge of the features 
of faces and the distributions of their values.  Together, these studies suggest that children 
display all the markers of face expertise by approximately ten years of age.  
  
1.3. Integration 
1.3.1. The Developmental Picture 
 
While face perception has been a dominant area of research in many different domains, these 
literatures remain relatively independent from each other.  The primary goal of this introduction 
was to integrate these literatures within a single theoretical model.  The above reviews of the 
literature have identified several consistent findings that highlight the development of face 
expertise.  However, many investigations have revealed findings that do not seem to be 
consistent with the developmental course of face expertise.  A deeper analysis of these studies is 
required to understand why the findings do not fit into the general trend of development.  An 
overview of the findings that are consistent with the general developmental course of face 
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expertise will be discussed first, followed by a detailed discussion of the findings that seem 
inconsistent with this trend, including suggestions for why these particular studies find results 
which are inconsistent with the developmental course of face expertise. 
 The adult face literature, specifically Valentine (1991, 1999), has conceptualized adult 
face perception and recognition within a framework of expertise and advanced knowledge of the 
features of faces, their average values and their distributions.  Evidence of this knowledge comes 
from findings that adults display typicality effects in gender classification (O’Toole et al., 1998); 
recognition advantage for distinctive versus typical faces (Light et al., 1979), same-race versus 
other-race faces (MacLin & Malpass, 2001), and caricatures (Lewis & Johnston, 1999); and 
universal agreement of attractiveness ratings (Langlois et al., 1987).  In addition, the research on 
adult face processing suggests that adults use configural strategies to analyze faces (Bartlett & 
Searcy, 1993).  Configural processing strategies reflect the use of second-order relations and 
require more subtle discriminations.  The face-space framework approach has yet to describe 
how configural processing strategy use can be incorporated, or how the shift from featural to 
configural strategies occurs in development.  It is possible that both featural and configural 
information is encoded in the face-space, but that configural information is used more frequently 
by expert perceivers, as it conveys more meaningful information.  This is an empirical question 
that would require follow-up investigations to answer.  Still, in order to clarify the development 
of face expertise, the developmental course of each of these skills needs to be identified.  The 
developmental literature has examined the development of most of these skills, though not in the 
context of the development of face expertise.  The development of these two components of face 
processing, processing strategies and expert knowledge, will be summarized in the following 
sections. 
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1.3.1.1.  Development of processing strategies.    The first component of the framework that is 
responsible for the advanced abilities of adults is the manner in which individuals’ process faces.  
The adult research indicates that individuals process faces in a more configural manner, 
especially as individuals gain more experience with faces.  The developmental literature has 
demonstrated a clear trend of increased use of configural strategies throughout development.  For 
instance, infants show the ability to process faces configurally in some tasks, although the 
advantage for configural over featural processing is not yet at adult-level (Cashon & Cohen, 
2004).  Cashon and Cohen (2004) have demonstrated a significant advantage for upright faces in 
comparison to inverted faces by seven months of age.  Toddlers and preschoolers also show the 
ability to process faces configurally, but tend to use featural strategies when they are available 
(e.g., Brace et al., 2001; Newell et al., 2004; Schwarzer, 2002).  Schwarzer (2002) employed a 
paradigm which pitted analytic and holistic processing strategies against one another.  Two- to 
five-year-old children chose to use analytic processing strategies more often.  However, Brace et 
al. (2001) demonstrated that two- to four-year-old children process upright and inverted faces 
differently from each other.  Older children (7-10 years old) show increased use of configural 
processing strategies, and begin using these strategies more efficiently (Schwarzer, 2000; Tanaka 
et al., 1998).   
1.3.1.2. Development of facial knowledge. The second component of the framework is 
the complex knowledge of faces which develops as a result of experience.  Adults have a highly 
advanced knowledge of the features of faces, their average values and the distribution of these 
values.  Researchers such as Tanaka and Gauthier (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & 
Nelson, 2001; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Tanaka, 2001) have consistently shown that adults possess 
expert knowledge of faces.  The previous review of the developmental literature suggests that 
 44 
individuals gain a more extensive knowledge base of faces throughout development.  For 
instance, gender categorization first develops with the most gender-typical faces and only later in 
development does it expand to include less typical faces (Newell & Strauss, in prep.).  This trend 
is indicative of more advanced knowledge of faces and more experience with less typical faces.  
Early in infancy, individuals have had only a limited amount of experience with different faces.  
The limitation of gender categorization to only the most typical faces is likely due to very narrow 
gender category distributions, a direct result of their limited experience with a variety of faces 
(see Figure 4).  The less typical faces in the world fall outside the individual’s narrow gender 
categories.  As the infant gains experience with a wider variety of faces, s/he also expands 
his/her gender categories.  The older child’s gender category distribution will look more like 
Figure 3, with a wider distribution of faces included and some degree of overlap where the less 
typical faces are found.  When children learn to classify less gender-typical faces, they are doing 
so because they now have the knowledge of faces necessary to reliably discriminate these faces 
and recognize the featural differences between them.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  Young infants’ representation of gender categories. 
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Another example of an increasing knowledge base can be seen in the development of the 
recognition advantage for distinctive versus typical faces.  Best et al. (2003) indicates that 
recognition performance for distinctive and typical faces is essentially identical for nine- to ten-
month-old infants.  By age three- to four-years old, however, children are beginning to show a 
slight recognition advantage for distinctive over typical faces (Best et al., 2003), indicating a 
more complete knowledge of the faces in their environment.  Future research would need to 
examine how the recognition advantage develops after the preschool years and when 
performance is comparable to adults. 
Advanced knowledge of the faces of a population, and their features, is responsible for 
developing the ability to categorize the gender of faces; developing a recognition advantage for 
distinctive faces, same-race faces, and caricatures; developing the ability to form prototypes of 
faces; and developing a preference for attractive faces.  The development of these skills is 
reflective of a growing face-space framework and more advanced dimensions of the framework.  
Each of the skills associated with the face-space framework theory develops as a result of 
increased knowledge and shows development of increasing performance in face perception or 
recognition tasks throughout infancy and childhood. 
1.3.1.3. Interaction of processing skills and facial knowledge. Neither the adult nor 
the developmental literature has considered how the knowledge base of facial features and their 
distributions might interact with the processing strategies chosen to encode and recognize faces.  
The adult literature includes a great deal of research devoted to exploring the separate roles of 
knowledge base and processing strategies on face processing, but has not yet addressed the 
interaction of the two.  Overall, the developmental literature has also ignored the potential 
interaction of these two components of face perception and recognition. For instance, the infancy 
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literature has mostly focused on changes in processing strategies (and the development of 
specific skills such as the recognition of the mother’s face).  Researchers exploring children’s 
face processing skills have also spent the majority of their efforts focused on changes in 
processing strategies, with very little attention paid to the growing knowledge base of faces.   
As the face space framework becomes more dense (as the result of experience with more 
faces), important developments in face perception may occur.  With a greater number of faces 
stored in face-space, individuals may discover that some areas of the face are more important for 
recognition than others.  Many different programs of research on adult face recognition have 
explored which areas of the face are most important for face recognition (e.g., Fraser, Craig, & 
Parker, 1990; Haig, 1986; Sadr, Jarudi, & Sinha, 2003).  However, little attention has been given 
to how this changes throughout development.  Infants, who have a very limited knowledge of 
faces, tend to use less efficient areas of the face for recognition.  Young infants (before four 
months) often are not scanning the internal features of the face (Maurer, 1985) and accomplish 
face recognition tasks (even with highly familiar faces such as the mother) by using qualities of 
the outer contours of the face and the hairstyle (e.g., Bushnell et al., 1989).  As infants get older, 
and therefore gain more experience with faces, they begin to explore more informative regions of 
the face, such as the eyes and mouth (Maurer, 1985).  Therefore, the infants’ knowledge of faces 
may affect the manner in which they process faces.  An exploration of the developmental course 
of feature areas used in face recognition could be very informative for discovering how the 
knowledge base is developing and its effect on processing strategies. 
In addition, research investigating which areas of the face are important for face 
recognition does not take into account the research on distinctive face memory.  Valentine 
(1991) and others have demonstrated that distinctive faces are easier to remember than typical 
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faces.  Although what determines the distinctiveness of faces is not well defined in the literature, 
it is usually discussed in terms of the distinctiveness of the entire face.  However, distinctiveness 
may be determined by specific features or configurations of features.  To date, researchers have 
not addressed how distinctiveness is determined in individual faces, nor how it interacts with 
which features of the face are important for memory.  Although some general set of features may 
be important across all faces, there may be some variation within individual faces.  For instance, 
most studies have shown that the lower face is less informative in face recognition (Fraser et al., 
1990) and the chin in particular has never been cited as being important in face recognition.  
However, most adults remember the chin as an identifying feature of a particular celebrity, Jay 
Leno.  The chin is a feature that is not often used in face recognition, but when it is particularly 
distinctive, it can be very useful for recognition.  Therefore, individuals may possess a hierarchy 
of features/configurations to attend to in face recognition.  If the features that are high in the 
hierarchy are very typical, then the individual may move down the hierarchy to identify features 
which are more distinctive.  Also, if one feature/configuration is very distinctive (i.e., Jay Leno’s 
chin), it may be elevated to the top of the hierarchy for that particular face.  Unfortunately, this 
idea has never been formally tested. 
    In addition to changes in which areas of the face are used for recognition, other changes 
may occur as the face-space framework develops.  Ultimately, the research on processing 
strategies suggests a shift from featural to configural processing strategies (e.g., Cashon & 
Cohen, 2004; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Schwarzer, 2000, 2002); configural processing use 
increases throughout development.  This increased use coincides with increases in experience 
with faces, although this may not be coincidental.  It seems possible that increased experience 
drives changes in processing.  That is, as children gain more experience with faces, they might 
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be forced to modify the organization of their face-space framework by expanding the distribution 
of a particular dimension, re-analyzing the central tendency of a particular dimension, 
incorporating a new dimension (feature or configuration) that has not been considered before, or 
chunking multiple dimensions (in a holistic manner).  This re-organization will continue, coupled 
with the old processing strategy, until it is no longer useful.  As the individual reaches such a 
point in development, the individual may shift processing changes in order to continue to 
develop the face-space framework. 
 
1.4. Discrepancies in the research literature 
Although the above review of the development of face perception and recognition skills seems to 
present a consistent developmental picture, there are some significant gaps in the research that 
need to be identified and explained.  The gaps in the literature separate into two categories.  The 
first type of gap is the result of research that has yet to be conducted.  This type of gap does not 
represent a problem with the literature; it is simply a reflection of the youth of the research area.  
The second type of gap is a result of a discrepancy in the results of the research conducted thus 
far.  This type of gap does represent a problem within the literature, and the possible reasons for 
these discrepant results will be addressed further.   
1.4.1. Gap 1: Areas of missing research 
 
The development of face processing skills is a relatively new area of research, with the first 
infancy face research conducted in the 1960’s (e.g., Fantz, 1961).  Since the investigation of the 
development of face perception and recognition is young, there is still a substantial amount of 
research that has yet to be conducted.  This issue has come into focus after a careful review of 
the literature.  There are many skill areas that have only been investigated in one or two age 
 49 
groups, thus not permitting a clear picture of the development of the skill across infancy and 
childhood, into adulthood.  For instance, Langlois and colleagues have worked very hard to 
explore the development of the preference for attractive faces in infancy (e.g., Langlois et al., 
1991; Langlois & Roggman, 1990; Langlois et al., 1987; Rubenstein et al., 1999).  The evidence 
suggests that by six months of age, infants possess a preference for attractive faces and that this 
preference affects their social interactions by 12 months of age (Langlois, Roggmann, & Rieser-
Danner, 1990).  However, very little research on this topic has been conducted with children.  
There is no indication of how this preference changes from infancy to adulthood and whether 
this preference changes during childhood, when children are being exposed to cultural standards 
and developing individual preferences. 
 Similarly, the development of gender categorization has been well-documented from 
infancy through the preschool years (Newell & Strauss, in prep.).  The research has indicated that 
infants first develop the ability to categorize the most gender-typical faces, around six months of 
age.  By the ages of three- to four-years old, children are able to categorize both typical and less 
typical faces, but not at an accuracy-level comparable to adults.  Sometime after the age of four 
years, children must develop the ability to categorize the gender of all faces in their environment 
at a level comparable to adults.  However, the research demonstrating the development to adult-
level has yet to be conducted. 
 Although the adult literature has reliably demonstrated the importance of research 
exploring the cross-race effect and the recognition of caricatures for demonstrating adults’ face 
perception and recognition skills and exploring the face-space representation, very little 
developmental work has investigated these two skills.  For example, by the age of six, children 
are able to identify caricatures faster than their veridical depiction and their anticaricatures 
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(Chang et al., 2002).  However, no research prior to age six has ever been conducted.  Therefore, 
there is no evidence demonstrating how children come to be able to identify caricatures.  The 
research investigating the development of the cross-race is also impoverished.  Very few studies 
have explored the development of this phenomenon; those studies that have been conducted do 
not convey a consistent developmental picture.   
1.4.2. Gap 2: Discrepant results 
 
Not all of the gaps in the developmental literature can be explained by identifying areas of 
missing research.  Unfortunately, some of the research that has already been conducted 
contradicts one another.  For instance, research on the development of configural processing of 
faces represents an area of research that has produced many discrepant results.  The infancy 
research (e.g., Cashon & Cohen, 2004; Cohen & Cashon, 2001) has shown that infants display a 
recognition advantage for upright versus inverted faces by seven months of age.  However, 
research with older children (e.g., Schwarzer, 2000; 2002) suggests that children do not actively 
use configural processing strategies until after seven years of age.  How do we reconcile these 
discrepancies?  One possibility is that the ability to process faces configurally develops in 
infancy, but that the efficiency with which children employ these strategies continues to increase 
throughout childhood.  However, the research of Cashon and Cohen (2004) and Brace et al. 
(2001) are still in contradiction of one another.  Cashon and Cohen (2004) suggests that infants 
show a recognition advantage for upright over inverted faces, yet Brace et al. (2001) suggests 
that preschoolers do not demonstrate this recognition advantage.  The possible reasons for 
discrepancies such as this will be discussed in the following section. 
 Another possibility to consider in integrating the research on the development of 
configural processing is the way in which researchers define configural processing.  As 
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mentioned before, the research by Schwarzer (2000, 2002) investigates the development of 
holistic processing, while the research of Tanaka et al. (1998) explores the development of 
configural processing.  There may be important differences between the definitions of these two 
terms.  Configural processing suggests encoding the spatial distances between the features of the 
face, attending to the relationships among the individual features.  Holistic processing, on the 
other hand, implies encoding the face as a whole, using the summation of all the features of the 
face.  Holistic processing stresses a focus on the “Gestalt,” where the whole of the face really is 
more important than the individual parts.  It is difficult to try to equate these two methods of face 
processing.  It may be that configural processing abilities, being able to represent the subtle 
differences within the face, must be present before holistic processing can develop.  Thus, any 
generalizations made from research using different terminology must take these potential 
differences into account.   
 The research exploring the development of the recognition advantage for distinctive faces 
versus typical faces also demonstrates the pattern of discrepant results from infancy to childhood.  
Best et al. (2003) indicates that the recognition advantage for distinctive faces versus typical 
faces has developed by 3- to 4-years old.  However, Johnston and Ellis (1995) do not find 
evidence of a recognition advantage for distinctive faces until seven years of age.  The 
differences in results may be due, in part, to the differences in methodologies, although further 
work still needs to be conducted to ascertain the developmental course of the recognition 
advantage for distinctive faces.  
 Some of the research on the development of face processing skills reveals results that 
appear to show a consistent trend of increasing performance, yet a closer look at the research 
suggests that some discrepancies may exist.  These research areas suffer from both types of gaps; 
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missing research and discrepant results.  For instance, the research on the development of 
prototype formation seems to follow a clear developmental course.  de Haan et al. (2001) 
demonstrated that 3-month-old infants are able to form a prototype from a series of four faces.  
During childhood the ability to form prototypes is present, but the false alarm rate increases from 
three to six years of age (Inn et al., 1993).  It is difficult to try to compare the results of these 
studies.  de Haan et al. (2001) did not investigate whether infants are able to form a prototype 
from more than four faces.  Also, the looking time paradigms used with infants do not allow for 
the measurement of false alarm rates, which is the relevant measurement for the childhood 
research.  Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether the false alarm rates found in 
childhood fit with the results revealed during infancy.  Overall, although the empirical data do 
not directly contradict each other, further research needs to be conducted to determine the 
developmental course of prototype formation. 
 
1.5. Reconciling the Discrepancies 
While the majority of the face perception research, when taken as a whole, appears to paint a 
clear picture of the development of face expertise, a closer examination such as this identifies a 
few inconsistencies in the literature that need to be addressed.  These inconsistencies tend to 
follow a specific pattern.  Infants are found to be relatively advanced face processors, while 
young children still have not reached adult-level performance.  While some studies imply very 
little development between infancy and childhood, others suggest that infants can accomplish 
tasks that children cannot.  Are we to believe that during the toddler and preschool years 
individuals lose some face recognition abilities?  How are we to resolve discrepancies such as 
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this?  There are several possible explanations for the discrepancies discussed previously, each of 
which will be discussed in this section.     
1.5.1. Methodological Issues 
 
When comparing competing research programs, one obvious place to begin is to look very 
carefully at the methodologies.  There are two possible explanations for the identified 
discrepancies which are nested together under the broad category of methodological issues.  The 
first explanation concerns stimulus issues; some stimuli have been used because they are 
practically implemented in the lab, and not necessarily because they are theoretically sound.  The 
other issue concerns the task demands of the different methodologies and the influence this may 
have on performance.  
1.5.1.1. Stimulus issues. Although developmental research has not given enough 
consideration to stimulus issues in the past, it is very important to consider the stimuli used in 
each study that was reviewed, especially in research with infants and young children.  If the 
experimenter cannot give instructions to the participant, or there is a chance that the participant 
will not fully understand the instructions, the stimuli provided to the participant play an even 
more important role.  Most of the developmental research uses stimuli that provide much less 
information than is available in the participant’s everyday environment.  For instance, most of 
the face perception and recognition research uses black and white photos or line drawings which 
include hair and clothing cues (e.g., Johnston & Ellis, 1995; Tanaka et al., 1998).  These stimuli 
may be inappropriate for several reasons.  First, the stimuli would be more realistic if color 
photos or dynamic videos were used.  By making the task more realistic, the researcher is more 
likely to elicit the true abilities of the participant.  Several different areas of perceptual research 
suggest that features of stimuli are more salient when motion is available (e.g., Bertenthal, 
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Proffitt, & Cutting, 1984; Slater & Butterworth, 1997; Spelke, 1988).  This finding also applies 
to face perception research (e.g., Arterberry et al., 2001).  In addition, the inclusion of hair and 
clothing cues may also mask the true abilities of the individual.  Hair cues are obvious and easily 
used to categorize or recognize faces.  In fact, newborns are able to recognize familiar faces 
when hair cues are present, but not when they are occluded (Pascalis et al., 1995).  However, 
using hair cues in a face perception or recognition task does not allow access to information 
about the individual’s knowledge of facial structure and the fine differences between individual 
faces.  By eliminating hair cues the research is truly measuring skills specific to faces.  Finally, 
research (e.g., Friere & Lee, 2001) has shown that children have difficulty ignoring irrelevant 
stimuli such as clothing in face recognition tasks.  If such extraneous information is available, 
children have difficulty ignoring this information to encode the finer details of the faces.  
Perhaps if the research with toddlers and older children addressed this issue, a more accurate 
representation of children’s abilities would be determined. 
1.5.1.2. Task demands. The other methodological issue to consider is the relative task 
demands of the infancy research compared to the childhood research.  Little attention has been 
given to the differences in the tasks given to infants as compared to those given to older children.  
However, there are two key differences that may result in the discrepancies highlighted above.  
The first issue is that the tasks given to infants may be less demanding, and thus easier, than the 
tasks given to older children.  Many of the infant studies employ paradigms that use paired 
comparisons (e.g., de Haan et al., 2001; Pascalis et al., 1998; Rubenstein et al., 1999), as opposed 
to the sequential recognition tasks used for older children (e.g., Inn et al., 1993; Johnston & Ellis, 
1995; Schwarzer, 2000).  Having both stimuli presented simultaneously in paired comparison 
tasks allows the individual to make active comparisons between the two.  However, in sequential 
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recognition tasks, the individual is required to keep the familiar stimulus in working memory to 
compare it to the test face, a task requiring more cognitive effort.  Also, infant studies almost 
always employ looking time paradigms, which only require the infant to recognize that the novel 
face is interesting in some way, which does not necessarily mean that the infant is explicitly 
aware of why the stimulus is interesting (e.g., Cashon & Cohen, 2004; de Haan et al., 2001; 
Newell & Strauss, 2002).  Research with older children requires a verbal or manual (i.e., finger 
pointing) response (e.g., Brace et al., 2001; Wild et al., 2000).  Thus, the research with older 
children necessitates a more explicit knowledge than the infancy research.  Keen (2003) 
compared performance of infants and toddlers on tasks of object and event representation.  A 
similar discrepancy was found in which infants appear to have a clear understanding of object 
properties and event outcomes, whereas toddlers seemed to be lacking in this knowledge area.  
Toddlers were tested in a looking-time paradigm to equate task difficulty across infants and 
toddlers, and Keen (2003) discovered that toddlers demonstrated more knowledge in this task 
than during tasks that required a manual response.  Therefore, the results from both infant and 
child research may be accurate, but measuring two different levels of knowledge or skills.  This 
difference may be able to account for the discrepancies identified in the research on the 
development of configural processing.   
 The other way in which task demands for infants and children may not be comparable is 
in the general differences between the types of tasks given to infants versus children.  Due to the 
limitations inherent to infancy research, all infant research paradigms are implicit tasks.  On the 
other hand, very few of the research designs used with toddlers and older children tap implicit 
knowledge.  Although researchers agree that face discrimination and recognition are automatic, 
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implicit processes (Fallshore & Schooler, 1995), face recognition tasks used with children may 
be tapping explicit mechanisms, a different processing system than the one that is used naturally.   
Research such as that by Ellis, Ellis, and Hosie (1993) demonstrate that implicit memory 
develops before explicit memory.  In fact, Ellis et al. (1993) indicates that implicit memory 
shows no improvement after age five, whereas explicit memory continues to develop during 
childhood.  Therefore, explicit memory may not be developed enough to manage the cognitive 
load of a face processing task during childhood.  Preschool children have been shown to be 
better at remembering information when presented in an incidental context (i.e., a shopping 
game) than in an intentional context (i.e., a lesson format; Istomina, 1975).  However, the results 
from the Istomina study did not distinguish between whether children remembered information 
more accurately in the game context due to inherent properties of incidental learning, or because 
they received more exposure with the items.  Replication attempts by Weissberg and Paris 
(1986) and Schneider and Brun (1987) strictly controlled for amount of exposure to the items in 
incidental and intentional conditions and did not find a difference in memory between the two 
conditions, despite overall age-related increases in memory.   
Newman (1990) investigated the effects of intentional and incidental learning in 
preschool children while controlling for exposure time and also manipulating the items to be 
remembered.  Children participated in either an intentional learning condition in which they were 
instructed to try to remember a set of items or an incidental learning condition in which they 
were simply told that they could do anything they wanted with the objects (pictures of objects for 
half of the children and small toys for the other half).  A fifth condition, the laboratory condition, 
was a more direct replication of the intentional learning conditions of previous studies.  Although 
there was not a main effect of condition (incidental vs.intentional), the means were in the 
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predicted direction.  The children did, however, demonstrate better memory for the items when 
presented in the “play” format than the “remember” format, but only when they were given toys 
to remember.  Recall for the laboratory condition was not significantly different from the 
Remember-Pictures condition, its most similar comparison.  The children were shown to have 
interacted with the stimulus materials at a deeper level (i.e., engaging in “functional” play rather 
than rehearsal) when presented in a play context as compared to an intentional learning context.  
Although counter-intuitive, preschool-age children appear to remember less information when 
explicitly instructed to remember something. 
The advantage for incidental memory over intentional memory is not limited to young 
children.  Experts in some fields have also been shown to remember information more accurately 
in incidental conditions than intentional conditions.  For instance, Norman, Brooks and Allen 
(1989) compared memory for laboratory data with expert medical practitioners and novices.  
Participants were instructed to either try to provide a diagnosis from the data (i.e., incidental 
learning) or to try to memorize the data (i.e., intentional learning).  The predicted Expertise x 
Condition interaction was significant.  Novices were more accurate in the “memorize” condition, 
while experts were more accurate in the “diagnose” condition.  Some other areas of expertise are 
also affected by task instructions.  For instance, Adelson (1984) demonstrated that memory of a 
computer program differed by level of processing for experts and novices.  Novices remembered 
the computer program more accurately in a “surface-level” task which involved simply 
describing the program while experts were more accurate in a “deep-level” task in which the 
participants were asked to identify the underlying goal of the program. 
As children get older, the advantage for incidental over intentional memory is reversed 
(Smirnov & Zinchenko, 1969).  Also, the advantage shifts from intentional to incidental memory 
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as an individual gains expertise with an area of information (Norman et al., 1989).  Thus, 
differences in incidental and intentional memory should be examined in the context of 
developing face skills.  Adults are thought to be experts in face recognition (e.g., Diamond & 
Carey, 1986; Gauthier et al., 2000).  Therefore, recognition performance should be better in 
incidental learning paradigms than intentional learning paradigms.  Also, children should 
demonstrate a shift from better performance intentionally to incidentally as they gain expertise 
with faces.  However, the majority of face recognition studies use intentional learning paradigms, 
and the two conditions have never been actively compared. 
There is other evidence to support the assumption that explicit tasks are more difficult 
and may mask the true abilities of children.  Evidence suggests that implicit, or unconscious, 
awareness reflects more advanced knowledge than explicit, or conscious, awareness.  Young 
children demonstrate production deficiencies in their strategy use.  In other words, young 
children have been shown to possess strategies, and that they try to use them, however they are 
poor at employing these strategies (DeLoache, Cassidy, & Brown, 1985).  Preschool-age 
children are often thought to not be able to respond to instructions “to remember” in a task 
because they have difficulty utilizing strategies that they may know (Moely, Olson, Hawles, & 
Flavell, 1969).  For instance, Siegler (2000) demonstrated that when children discover a new 
mathematical strategy, they first apply it without awareness (i.e., they report using another, less 
advanced strategy) before they verbally report using the new strategy.  Also, research on the use 
of gestures suggests that advances in knowledge can be seen in gestures before speech (Church 
& Goldin-Meadow, 1986; Graham, 1999; Perry, Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988).  When the 
gestures of children are examined during a task, children who are on the verge of discovering a 
new strategy will first show evidence of this strategy in their gestures.   
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Most of the studies on the development of face recognition employ intentional learning 
paradigms, which may tap into less advanced face processing skills.  This problem may be 
exacerbated by underdeveloped face perception skills.  If face perception and recognition skills 
are not fully developed during childhood (as suggested by most of the research conducted thus 
far), and explicit memory and processing strategies are not fully developed (e.g., Ellis et al., 
1993), the interaction of these two factors may have very important consequences for 
performance in face processing tasks.  The combination of these two weak skills may result in 
even poorer performance in face processing tasks than would be found if only one of these skills 
was being tested.  Studies that are designed to examine the development of face processing skills 
may also be measuring the development of explicit processing without intending to.  Research 
paradigms for children may place too much of an explicit processing requirement on participants.  
There is some evidence to suggest that implicit paradigms, being more naturalistic, allow access 
to more advanced processing of faces than explicit paradigms.  The conflicting research on the 
development of the distinctiveness effect may be explained by considering the differences in task 
demands for the different studies.   
1.5.2. Developmental course issues 
 
The ideas put forth above concerning the methodological issues of infancy and childhood face 
research have never been tested.  Perhaps a systematic investigation of these issues would reveal 
that the inconsistencies do not really exist, but only appear to be there due to differences in 
stimuli and task demands.  If this is not true, what other explanations might exist for the 
discrepancies between infant and child face processing skills?  Perhaps the discrepancies are not 
due to incompatible task comparisons, but instead a result of an incomplete picture of the 
developmental course of face perception.  If the research that has been conducted thus far 
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accurately reflects the development of face perception and recognition skills, then perhaps the 
developmental course of face processing skills needs to be examined more closely.  There are 
two possible deviations from the traditional developmental course of a linear increase in skills 
that may explain the findings from the developmental face literature.  One possibility is that there 
exists a U-shaped curve in the development of face processing skills.  Infants may discriminate 
and recognize faces at a reasonably advanced level, but they may be doing so in a fundamentally 
different way than adults.  If this is true, it is possible then that during childhood there is a shift 
in processing or focus such that children actually become worse than infants at more advanced 
face perception tasks.  One suggestion concerning the potential difference in processing has been 
suggested by Susan Carey.  Her research (e.g., Carey & Diamond, 1977) suggests that infants 
and young children may be processing faces using featural processing strategies, and that a shift 
occurs during childhood to configural processing.  More recent research (e.g., Cashon & Cohen, 
2004; Thompson et al., 2001) suggests that infants are able to process faces configurally, but 
there may be other changes in face perception/recognition skills during childhood that could 
account for a U-shaped curve in development.  For instance, there may be an important shift in 
the structure of one’s face-space framework that could account for a U-shaped curve in 
development. 
 The other variation in the developmental course of face perception and recognition that 
may exist is a slowing of development between infancy and childhood.  Infants have been shown 
to possess an impressive number of face skills by the end of the first year (e.g., Cashon & Cohen, 
2004; de Haan et al., 2001; Langlois et al., 1991; Newell & Strauss, in prep.).  It is possible that 
the skills that infants possess at the end of their first year are sufficient to allow them to function 
in their environment.  During the toddler and preschool years, children may focus on developing 
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other skills that are necessary for interacting in their world, such as language skills.  Thus, 
individuals may put the development of more advanced face skills on hold until later in 
childhood, to allow more cognitive effort to be focused on the development of more important 
skills.  Further research would need to be conducted to explore the true developmental course of 
face expertise.     
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2. EXPERIMENT 
 
 
 
The present study was designed to address some of the important issues raised in the previous 
review.  Unfortunately, not all of the identified issues can be addressed in one empirical 
endeavor, and thus one critical area was addressed in this study: the cross-race effect of face 
recognition, which provides a platform to begin a systematic program of research to address 
many critical issues in the face recognition research literature.  The current study aimed to 
resolve three issues.  The first issue that the present study addressed was the lack of research on 
the development of face knowledge.  The cross-race effect reflects an individual’s advanced 
knowledge of the faces which s/he has experienced most often.  This effect has not been 
examined in enough detail in past research to adequately address when this effect arises in 
development.  In other words, when do children possess a sufficient amount of knowledge about 
the faces in their environment that they recognize these faces with greater accuracy than other-
race faces?   
The second critical issue raised in this paper that has not been addressed previously in the 
face recognition literature is the role of incidental versus intentional learning tasks.  Incidental 
learning tasks allow comparisons across infancy and childhood research, as infancy research 
paradigms cannot be made intentional.  In addition, incidental learning paradigms may also more 
accurately measure face recognition skills.  Face recognition is an incidental process in the 
natural environment; however, the majority of the previous face recognition studies have not 
employed incidental learning paradigms.  Young children have been shown to display better 
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memory for items when presented in an incidental learning paradigm than an intentional learning 
paradigm (Istomina, 1975).  In addition, experts remember information from their area of 
expertise more accurately under incidental learning conditions than intentional learning 
conditions.  The current study actively compared the effects of incidental versus intentional 
learning paradigms.  Based on previous research, incidental learning conditions were predicted to 
elicit more accurate recognition for young children and experts (i.e., adults).  This pattern may 
not hold true for the older children, when intentional learning is more efficient (e.g., memory 
strategies are effectively utilized) and face recognition skills have not yet reached the level of 
expertise. 
The third and final issue is one that has been addressed in the adult literature, yet never 
considered in the developmental literature; the role that distinctiveness plays in the cross-race 
effect.  Distinctiveness has been shown to play an important role in the recognition of faces, in 
studies of the recognition abilities of both children and adults.  Distinctive faces are more 
accurately recognized than typical faces.  Valentine and Endo (1992) did not find an interaction 
between distinctiveness and race; however, distinctive faces were recognized more accurately 
than typical faces regardless of race.  The distinctiveness effect has been shown with children as 
young as three years old and thus should be a factor to consider when testing recognition 
memory.  Unfortunately, distinctiveness has yet to be addressed in the developmental studies 
exploring the cross-race effect.  None of the studies have measured the distinctiveness of the 
stimulus faces, therefore it is impossible to ascertain whether the samples were equally 
recognizable. Studies which test only one race of participant, however, risk the possibility that 
distinctiveness of the stimuli is affecting the results.  For instance, if the own-race faces are more 
distinctive than the cross-race faces, a stronger cross-race effect would emerge due to the 
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distinctiveness effect of recognition.  In addition to distinctiveness needing to be well-controlled, 
the role of distinctiveness in cross-race recognition is also an important question to address in 
terms of face-space development.  It has previously been assumed that other-race faces are stored 
in the perimeter of the own-race face space.  Other-race faces are stored according to the 
typicality distributions of own-race faces and, therefore, are clustered closely together in the 
perimeter.  Previous research (e.g., Valentine and Endo, 1992) has shown that the recognition 
advantage for distinctive faces is present in both own- and other-race faces.  Thus, 
distinctiveness appears to be important in recognition of both own- and other-race faces.  
However, an exploration of the interaction between distinctiveness and race is an important 
avenue of research that has not been considered in the developmental literature.  It may be 
possible to see the emergence of a distinctiveness effect in other-race faces later than for same-
race faces, as it takes more years of experience with faces to learn the typicality distributions of 
other races of faces. 
Previous research exploring the role of distinctiveness in cross-race recognition has 
typically utilized a collection of faces which vary in distinctiveness based on adult raters.  
However, none of these studies have looked at recognition of the extremes of distinctiveness, the 
most and least distinctive faces in a stimulus pool.  Cross-race recognition accuracy for these 
faces may yield different results than those previously found.  Individuals with a moderate 
amount of contact with other-race faces may have begun to extract a typicality distribution, 
accounting for the distinctiveness effect found by Valentine and Endo (1992).  As there are fewer 
other-race faces in a typical face space, the very distinctive other-race faces may occupy a less 
densely populated region of face space than the very distinctive own-race faces.  If individuals 
do possess a rudimentary knowledge of typicality distributions for other-race faces, and store 
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them accordingly, then the very distinctive other-race faces may be recognized more accurately 
than the very distinctive own-race faces.  
 Finally, the present study examined the development of the cross-race effect within three 
development groups and compared these age groups to a group of adult participants.  Subtle 
changes in the developmental course of this skill may be revealed by examining it across six 
years of development.  As mentioned, it is unknown whether face recognition skills follow a 
linear developmental path, a U-shaped developmental curve, or plateau at some point before 
steadily increasing again.  The data collected from the three developmental time points examined 
in the present study were predicted to implicate a particular developmental course. 
 The present study examined the development of the cross-race effect with 5-, 8-, and 11-
year-old children.  The children were familiarized to both Caucasian (same-race) and Asian 
(other-race) faces, and recognition accuracy for the two racial groups was compared.  The 
stimulus faces also varied in distinctiveness; half of the faces were distinctive and half were 
typical.  The participants were told a story which included the familiarization period, a short 
delay, and the test trials.  In order to compare incidental and intentional learning paradigms, half 
of the participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions.  In the 
intentional condition, participants were given specific instructions that they would need to 
memorize the faces they saw in the story.  In the incidental condition, participants were not given 
specific instructions to memorize the faces, but were simply asked to observe a story.  
To summarize, the present study predicted that increased experience with same-race faces would 
lead to the development of face recognition skills.  Moreover, this increased experience would 
not transfer to all faces, thus leading to the formation of the cross-race effect.  This led to five 
predictions that were tested in the current study: 
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1)  With age, the overall recognition performance would improve as a result of increased face 
recognition skills. 
2)  The cross-race effect would emerge between five and eleven years of age, and the strength of 
the effect would increase with age. 
3)  An overall distinctiveness advantage would be evident at all ages. 
4)  Recognition accuracy would be better for participants in the incidental learning condition 
than the intentional learning condition, at least for the 5-year-old children and the adults. 
5)  The cross-race effect would possibly be more pronounced in the incidental learning 
condition, as this condition allowed for more advanced and naturalistic processing of faces. 
The current study was designed to test these predictions.   
 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
 
The participants included five-year-old children (n=33, M=68.2 months), 8-year-old children 
(n=30, M=103.9 months), 11-year-old children (n=21, M=135.4 months) and adults (n=30).  
None of the participants reported any major developmental disorders.  The children were 
recruited from rural elementary schools and child care centers in western Pennsylvania, an area 
which is composed of almost exclusively Caucasian individuals.  Children were recruited by a 
letter sent home to the parents.  The adult participants were recruited from undergraduate classes 
at the University of Pittsburgh.   
2.1.2. Stimuli 
 
One hundred female Caucasian faces were extracted from the CD version of Akira Gomi’s art 
book Americans 1.0.  One hundred female Chinese faces were digitized from Akira Gomi’s art 
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book Yellows 3.0.  All faces were forward-facing with a neutral expression and a common 
background.  All faces were presented in black and white, to eliminate any obvious differences 
in skin tone between the Caucasian and Chinese faces.  The Caucasian faces were rated for 
distinctiveness by Caucasian undergraduates.  The Chinese faces were rated for distinctiveness 
by Chinese volunteers.  Faces were rated on a scale from one to seven, with one meaning “least 
distinctive” and seven meaning “most distinctive”.  Raters were told that a distinctive face is one 
that would stand out in a crowd because of unusual or unique features or overall appearance.  
Raters were also told that a typical (or non-distinctive) face is one that would not stand out in a 
crowd, but have an overall average or typical appearance. The eight most distinctive and eight 
least distinctive faces from each race were selected.  The mean ratings for these 32 faces were 
entered into a 2-way (Race x Distinctiveness) ANOVA.  There was no main effect of race 
(F=0.91, p>.1).  There was a main effect of Distinctiveness (F=608.2, p<.001).  There was also a 
significant Race x Distinctiveness interaction (F=4.57, p<.05).  This interaction was due to a 
marginal difference between the Asian and Caucasian ratings for the distinctive faces (F=3.97, 
p=0.06), with Caucasian faces being slightly more distinctive (M=5.68, SD=0.36) than Asian 
faces (M=5.27, SD=0.42), but no difference between the Asian and Caucasian ratings for the 
typical faces (F=0.88, p>.1).  The digitized faces were cropped in Microsoft Picture It! so that 
hair and clothing cues were eliminated.  This process ensured that the participants were not able 
to recall the faces based on idiosyncratic features such as hairstyle or specific clothing items (see 
Figure 5).   
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Figure 5  Examples of stimulus faces 
 
 
2.1.3. Apparatus 
 
Participants were tested individually, in a quiet room.  The stimuli were presented on a 15-inch 
computer monitor using Microsoft Powerpoint presentations.  Participants were seated a 
consistent distance from the computer monitor, approximately 24-30 inches away.  The 
experimenter was seated next to the participant and recorded answers from the recognition trials 
on a coding sheet. 
2.1.4. Procedure 
 
Participants were brought into a quiet room and told that they were going to hear a story that they 
would be asked to participate in.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
conditions, in which faces were introduced either incidentally or intentionally.  Participants in 
the incidental condition were told only that they would hear a story and to pay attention to it.  
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Participants in the intentional condition were told that they would hear a story and they would 
need to try to memorize the faces of the individuals in the story, as they would be tested on these 
faces at the end of the story.  Both conditions were identical except for the instructions given 
before the story.   
The storybook format allowed each face to be introduced individually in a naturalistic 
manner.  The story involved a social setting (i.e., a birthday party for the children and a sorority 
competition for the adults) in which each face was introduced as a party guest/competition 
participant.  The participants were encouraged to engage in the story through verbal interaction 
with the experimenter about particular aspects of the story.  For instance, participants were 
presented with a two-dimensional model of a table and chairs and were asked to choose a seat for 
each guest/competitor as she arrived at the door.  This procedure elicited participation in the 
story and ensured that attention was given to each familiarization face.      
Both stories were age-appropriate and structurally similar, except for the themes.  Both 
stories consisted of three main sections.  The first part of the stories was used to introduce the 
faces, when the participant “meets” the party guests.  The second part was a delay period in 
which the stories continued, but the participant did not see the faces during this time.  The final 
part of the stories consisted of a recognition test in which the participant was asked to identify 
which faces were seen at the party. 
2.1.4.1. Birthday party story 
FAMILIARIZATION PERIOD 
During the familiarization period, the participants were introduced to the “party-goers” 
individually.  Each participant was introduced to 16 female faces (8 Caucasian and 8 Asian).  
After a brief description about the birthday party, the guests began arriving.  Participants in the 
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incidental condition were not told anything about remembering the guests; they were simply 
introduced to each guest as a part of the story.  Participants in the intentional condition, however, 
were told that it was very important to study each face carefully, as they would have to identify 
the party guests later in the story.  Each guest was greeted at the door by Sally, the birthday girl.  
The face of each guest was presented alone on screen (see Fig. 5) for a consistent amount of time 
(approximately five seconds) while Sally greeted the guest.  The appearance of the face (i.e., 
cropped in tight circle, black and white) was integrated into the story by explaining that the child 
was seeing the face through the peephole in the door. 
DELAY PERIOD 
After all the guests arrived, the party began.  During the birthday party, Sally and her friends 
played a variety of games and participated in several different activities, such as eating birthday 
cake (see Figure 6 for example of activities).  Each slide depicted a scene of an activity at the 
birthday party, but the only faces that were shown were clip art pictures.  Thus, the children were 
not re-exposed to the familiarization faces during the delay period.  The length of the delay 
period varied slightly with each participant, depending on the level of interaction of the child.  
However, the average length of delay was three to five minutes.  In the story, the last activity at 
the birthday party was the opening of the gifts.  However, before Sally could open her gifts, she 
discovered that someone had taken all of her birthday gifts.  The participants were then asked to 
identify which girls were at the birthday party to help Sally’s mom and dad figure out who had 
taken the presents. 
TEST PERIOD 
After the delay period, the children were asked to identify the sixteen faces they met at the 
beginning of the story.  They were presented with 32 faces, sequentially, and asked whether each 
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face was present at the party.  There were an equal number of Caucasian and Asian faces.  Thus, 
the test trials consisted of 50% old and 50% new faces.  Each face in the test trials were 
presented full-screen, identical to the presentation of familiarization faces (see Figure 5).   
 
                 
 
Figure 6  Example of birthday party activity. 
 
 
2.1.4.2. Sorority party story. The sorority party story was used for the adult participants.  
The story was very similar in structure to the birthday party story, to allow for accurate 
comparisons between age groups.  The 32 female faces were the same faces as those used in the 
children’s story.  The adult story also included familiarization, delay and test periods. 
FAMILIARIZATION PERIOD 
The story began by introducing the plot of the story, a competition between pledges and sisters 
for a sorority on campus.  Each familiarization face was introduced as a competitor upon arrival 
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at the party.  In the incidental learning condition, participants simply saw each face arrive at the 
party and were not told anything about remembering these faces.  In the intentional learning 
condition, participants were told that it was very important to study the faces carefully, as they 
would have to recognize these faces later in the story.   
DELAY PERIOD 
After all the guests arrived for the competition, there were a series of activities that the pledges 
and sisters competed in, such as table tennis and miniature golf (see Figure 7 for example of 
activities).  During this time, the familiarization faces were not seen again.  All faces presented 
in the delay period were cartoon drawings from clip art.  While the exact amount of time elapsed 
during the delay period varied slightly with each participant, the average amount of delay was 
three to five minutes.   
 
                
 
Figure 7  Example of sorority competition activity. 
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TEST PERIOD 
After the delay period, the participants were asked to identify, from a series of faces, which were 
the pledges that participated in the competition.  Similar to the ending of the children’s story, at 
the end of the competition it was discovered that someone took the trophy for the competition.  
The participant was asked to help identify who participated in the competition to minimize the 
suspect list.  A series of 32 faces were presented to the participants (16 old, 16 new).  The 
participants were asked to identify each face as “old” or “new.”   
 
2.2. Results 
Table 1 provides estimates of percent correct, hits, false alarms, discrimination accuracy (A’), 
and response criterion (B’’).   Percent correct was analyzed as a general indicator of 
performance, while A’ was analyzed as a more sensitive measure of accuracy, taking response 
bias into account.  The hit rate provides a measure of participants’ recognition of previously seen 
faces.  The false alarm rate provides a sense of which faces were misidentified as “old”, in other 
words, which faces were confused most often.  The results for each measure will be discussed 
separately. 
2.2.1. Percent correct 
 
Calculation of percent correct provides an overall sense of recognition accuracy, without taking 
into account the participant’s response bias.  To examine between-subjects effects, the total 
percent correct out of the 32 test trials was entered into an Age (5-, 8-, and 11-year olds and 
adults) x Gender (Male vs. Female) x Condition (Incidental vs. Intentional) ANOVA.  There was 
a significant main effect of age (F(3,111)=3.87, p<.05).  Post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed that 
5-year olds (M=63.0, SD=0.02) performed significantly worse than adults (M=71.0, SD=0.02;  
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Table 1:  Dependent variable scores for all age groups 
 
 
   
Percent 
Correct Hits 
False 
Alarms A’ B’’ 
Distinctive 67.0(16.5) .57(.31) .26(.24) .71(.21) .28(.74) 
Caucasian 
Typical 57.2(15.9) .65(.31) .52(.28) .60(.25) -.31(.73) 
Distinctive 70.1(15.3) .64(.30) .24(.24) .78(.17) .25(.79) 
5-year olds 
Asian 
Typical 57.5(16.1) .57(.27) .42(.28) .59(.23) .01(.71) 
Distinctive 68.8(17.9) .58(.28) .21(.23) .75(.21) .47(.64) 
Caucasian 
Typical 63.8(18.4) .65(.25) .37(.25) .67(.25) .01(.67) 
Distinctive 78.8(13.2) .67(.27) .12(.16) .85(.12) .53(.70) 
8-year olds 
Asian 
Typical 62.9(19.6) .66(.25) .38(.31) .68(.24) .00(.76) 
Distinctive 76.8(17.3) .60(.33) .11(.15) .81(.18) .67(.46) 
Caucasian 
Typical 64.9(17.5) .62(.31) .35(.30) .66(.24) .14(.82) 
Distinctive 79.8(12.8) .71(.23) .14(.19) .86(.12) .44(.71) 
11-year olds 
Asian 
Typical 56.5(17.9) .63(.28) .49(.24) .60(.24) -.19(.66) 
Distinctive 77.5(17.5) .70(.24) .13(.16) .86(.13) .57(.51) 
Caucasian 
Typical 67.9(15.3) .67(.20) .32(.25) .73(.18) .13(.73) 
Distinctive 77.9(12.1) .68(.22) .10(.14) .88(.08) .53(.68) 
Adults 
Asian 
Typical 65.0(19.3) .67(.25) .37(.30) .69(.24) .01(.73) 
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p<.01), marginally different from 11-year olds (M-69.2, SD=0.02; p<.1 ), but not significantly 
different from 8-year olds (M=69.4, SD=0.02; p>.1).  There was a marginal Age x Condition 
interaction (F(3,111)=2.42, p=0.07) due to greater accuracy in the intentional condition (M=74.7, 
SD=0.03) than the incidental condition (M=64.0, SD=0.02; t=2.75, p<.05) for the 8-year olds 
only.  All other age groups performed similarly in the incidental and intentional conditions 
(p>.1).  As there was no main effect of or interactions with gender, this factor was collapsed in 
subsequent analyses. 
The average percent correct was calculated for the distinctive Asian faces, the typical Asian 
faces, the distinctive Caucasian faces, and the typical Caucasian faces (see Table 2).  These 
scores were entered into a Race (Asian vs. Caucasian) x Distinctiveness (Distinctive vs. Typical) 
x Age (5-, 8-, 11-year olds and adults) x Condition (Incidental vs. Intentional) Mixed ANOVA.  
As predicted, there was a significant main effect of distinctiveness (F(1,113)=68.83, p<.001) 
with distinctive faces being recognized more accurately (M=74.8, SD=0.01) than typical faces 
(M=62.0, SD=0.01).  There was also a significant main effect of age (F(3,111)=3.47, p<.05).  
Post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed that 5-year olds (M=63.0, SD=0.02) performed significantly 
worse than adults (M=71.9, SD=0.02; p<.05), marginally different from 11-year olds (M-69.4, 
SD=0.02; p=.08), but not significantly different from 8-year olds (M=69.2, SD=0.02; p>.1).  
Finally, there was a Race x Distinctiveness interaction (F(3,111)=6.42, p<.05).  This interaction 
was due to Asian distinctive faces (M=0.77, SD=0.01) being recognized more accurately than 
Caucasian distinctive faces (M=0.73, SD=0.02; t=2.60, p<.01), but Asian typical faces (M=0.61, 
SD=0.02) being recognized as accurately as Caucasian typical faces (M=0.64, SD=0.02; t=1.13, 
p>.05).  Therefore, a difference between own- and other-race faces was only found for the 
distinctive faces, where Asian faces are recognized more accurately than Caucasian faces. 
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2.2.2. Hits 
 
The average numbers of hits was computed to provide an estimate of how often participants 
correctly identified a face that they had seen previously.  To examine between-subjects effects, 
the total hit rate was entered into an Age (5-, 8-, 11-year olds and adults) x Gender (Male vs. 
Female) x Condition (Incidental vs. Intentional) ANOVA.  There was a significant main effect of 
condition (F(1,113)=6.12, p<.05) due to more hits in the intentional condition (M=68.0, 
SD=0.02) than the incidental condition (M=60.3, SD=0.02).  As there were no main effects or 
interactions for gender or age, these factors were collapsed in subsequent analyses. 
The average hit rate was calculated for the distinctive Asian faces, the typical Asian faces, 
the distinctive Caucasian faces, and the typical Caucasian faces.  These scores were entered into 
a Race (Asian vs. Caucasian) x Distinctiveness (Distinctive vs. Typical) x Condition (Incidental 
vs. Intentional) Mixed ANOVA.  There was a significant main effect of condition (F(1, 
113)=7.06, p<.01) with participants in the intentional condition remembering the faces more 
accurately (M=67.9, SD=0.02) than participants in the incidental learning condition (M=60.2, 
SD=0.02).  There was also a marginal Race x Distinctiveness interaction (F(3, 111)=3.13, 
p=0.08).  This interaction was due to distinctive Asian faces being recognized more accurately 
(M=0.67, SD=0.26) than distinctive Caucasian faces (M=0.61, SD=0.29; t=2.03, p<.05).  There 
was not a significant difference in hit rate for typical Asian (M=0.63, SD=0.26) and Caucasian 
(M=0.65, SD=0.27).  No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
2.2.3. False Alarms 
 
The false alarm rate provides a measure of how frequently “new” faces were incorrectly judged 
to be “old” faces.  To examine between-subjects effects, the total false alarm rate was entered 
into an Age (5-, 8-, 11-year olds and adults) x Gender (Male vs. Female) x Condition (Incidental 
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vs. Intentional) ANOVA.  There was a significant main effect of age (F(3, 111)=3.34, p<.05).  
Post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed that 5-year olds had significantly more false alarms (M=0.36, 
SD=0.03) than the adult participants (M=0.23, SD=0.03; p=.01).  No other age groups were 
significantly different from each other.  There were no main effects or interactions of gender or 
condition; these factors were collapsed in subsequent analyses. 
The average false alarm rate was calculated for the distinctive Asian faces, the typical Asian 
faces, the distinctive Caucasian faces, and the typical Caucasian faces.  These scores were 
entered into a Race (Asian vs. Caucasian) x Distinctiveness (Distinctive vs. Typical) x Age (5-, 
8-, 11-year olds and adults) Mixed ANOVA.  There was a significant main effect of 
distinctiveness (F(1, 113)=157.94, p<.001) with distinctive faces eliciting fewer false alarms 
(M=0.16, SD=0.01) than typical faces (M=0.40, SD=0.02).  There was also a significant main 
effect of age (F(3, 111)=3.77, p<.05).  Post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed that five-year-old 
children responded with more false alarms (M=0.36, SD=0.03) than adults (M=0.23, SD=0.03; 
p<.01); there were no other differences between age groups.   
2.2.4. A’ 
 
The A’ statistic is a nonparametric measure of signal detection which uses both the hit rate and 
the false alarm rate for calculation (Rae, 1976).  A’ scores generally range from .5, representing 
chance performance, to 1.0, representing perfect accuracy.  Rae’s correction was used to correct 
for false alarm rates that exceeded hit rates.  To examine between-subjects effects, the overall A’ 
was entered into an Age (5-, 8-, 11-year olds and adults) x Gender (Male vs. Female) x 
Condition (Incidental vs. Intentional) ANOVA.  There was a significant main effect of age (F(3, 
111)=3.32, p<.05).  Post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed that 5-year olds were significantly less 
accurate (M=0.70, SD=0.02) than the adult participants (M=0.79, SD=0.02; p<.05).  No other age 
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groups were significantly different from each other (p>.1).  There were no main effects or 
interactions of gender or condition; these factors were collapsed in subsequent analyses. 
The A’ statistic was calculated for the distinctive Asian faces, the typical Asian faces, the 
distinctive Caucasian faces, and the typical Caucasian faces.  These scores were entered into a 
Race (Asian vs. Caucasian) x Distinctiveness (Distinctive vs. Typical) x Age (5-, 8-, 11-year olds 
and adults) Mixed ANOVA.  As predicted, there was a significant main effect of distinctiveness 
(F(1, 113)=63.25, p<.001) with distinctive faces being recognized more accurately (M=0.81, 
SD=0.01) than typical faces (M=0.65, SD=0.02).  There was also a significant main effect of age 
(F(3, 111)=5.31, p<.05).  According to the Tukey HSD post hoc tests, five-year-old children 
were significantly less accurate (M=0.67, SD=0.02) than adults (M=0.78, SD=0.02; p<.01); there 
were no other differences between age groups.  There was also a significant Race x 
Distinctiveness interaction (F(3, 111)=5.64, p<.05).  The interaction was due to distinctive Asian 
faces being recognized more accurately (M=0.84, SD=0.01) than distinctive Caucasian faces 
(M=0.78, SD=0.02; t=3.58, p>.01).  There was no difference between recognition of typical 
Asian (M=0.64, SD=0.24) and Caucasian faces (M=0.67, SD=0.23; t=0.83, p>.1). 
2.2.5. B” 
 
B” is a measure of response criterion.  B” scores can range from -1.0 (strongest bias to respond 
“old”) to +1.0 (strongest bias not to respond “old”).  A B” score of 0 represents a response 
pattern without any bias to respond either way.  To examine between-subjects effects, the overall 
B” was entered into an Age (5-, 8-, 11-year olds and adults) x Gender (Male vs. Female) x 
Condition (Incidental vs. Intentional) ANOVA.  There were no main effects or interactions of the 
between-subjects factors.  Since there were no main effects or interactions of age, gender or 
condition, these factors were collapsed in subsequent analyses. 
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The B” statistic was calculated based on hit and false alarm rates for the distinctive Asian 
faces, the typical Asian faces, the distinctive Caucasian faces, and the typical Caucasian faces.  
These scores were entered into a Race (Asian vs. Caucasian) x Distinctiveness (Distinctive vs. 
Typical) Mixed ANOVA.  There was a significant main effect of distinctiveness (F=62.53, 
p<.001) with participants judging the distinctive faces more conservatively (M=0.45, SD=0.05) 
than typical faces (M=-0.03, SD=0.05).  There was no main effect of race and no Race x 
Distinctiveness interaction (p>.1). 
In summary, all the dependent measures suggest that participants typically became more 
accurate in face recognition across age, as evidenced by significant main effects of age.  Also, 
there was a very strong distinctiveness effect found in all five measures of recognition, with 
distinctive faces were recognized more accurately than typical faces.  Finally, a significant cross-
race effect arose from distinctive Asian faces being recognized more accurately than distinctive 
Caucasian faces.   
 
2.3. Summary and Conclusions 
The current study explored the development of the cross-race effect at four different ages from 
five years of age to adulthood in a unique research design that addressed the role of 
distinctiveness in the cross-race effect.  The current study represents a small step towards 
addressing some of the discrepancies highlighted previously.  The results cited here have 
important implications for face recognition research in general, and the role of race and 
distinctiveness in particular.  The storybook design represents a new paradigm that allows for a 
more naturalistic measure of face recognition performance, although it has yet to be directly 
compared to the more traditional methods of face recognition research.  In addition, the results 
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indicate that the interaction between race and distinctiveness is more complex than previously 
thought.   
As predicted, age was a significant between-subjects factor for all markers of recognition, 
indicating that face recognition skills increased with age.  Interestingly, the only significant 
difference in performance was between the five-year-old children and adults.  Previous literature 
has suggested, however, that face recognition skills are not fully developed, or adult-like, until 
ten years of age or older.  The present study demonstrates that there are no differences in 
recognition performance from eight years of age and older, which suggests that face recognition 
skills may be reaching adult-levels earlier than previously suggested.  The unique paradigm 
utilized in the current study makes the task of face recognition more naturalistic.  This may be 
one reason why face recognition performance was similar to adults as early as eight years of age 
in the current study. 
Although it was predicted that there would be a difference in performance between the 
racial groups, surprisingly, there were no significant differences between Asian and Caucasian 
faces.  Participants at all ages recognized the Asian and Caucasian faces with a similar degree of 
accuracy.  It is possible that the lack of differences in recognition of Asian and Caucasian faces 
may be related to the very strong effect of distinctiveness found in this study. That is, children 
and adults showed better memory for distinctive faces than typical faces, regardless of the race of 
each face.  The main effect of distinctiveness was highly significant (p<.001) for all measures of 
recognition.  Furthermore, there was no interaction between Age and Distinctiveness, which 
suggests that the recognition advantage for distinctiveness was apparent by 5 years of age.  This 
is an important finding by itself.  Previous research (Gilchrist & McKone, 2003; Johnston & 
Ellis, 1995) has not found evidence of a distinctiveness effect in recognition accuracy until seven 
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years of age.  Johnston and Ellis (1995) demonstrated that the distinctiveness effect was not at 
adult-level until 9 years of age.  Again, the unique design of the current study may have allowed 
for more naturalistic recognition performance, and may be a more accurate reflection of face 
recognition skills. 
Although there was not a main effect of Race, there was, however, an interaction between 
Race and Distinctiveness, which was due to distinctive Asian faces being remembered more 
accurately than distinctive Caucasian faces.  Recognition of the typical faces, on the other hand, 
did not differ between racial groups.  The sampling of faces used in this particular study may 
have revealed an interesting phenomenon in face recognition that has not been considered 
previously.  The current study demonstrated that the cross-race effect reverses for very 
distinctive faces and disappears for very typical faces.  The faces for the distinctive and typical 
stimulus groups for the current study were selected from the extremes of a distribution of 
distinctiveness ratings for each race group.  This method of choosing stimuli was highly effective 
for ascertaining the role of distinctiveness in face recognition; however, it may have masked any 
potential cross-race effects.  The distinctive faces were recognized so well and the typical faces 
were recognized so poorly (although not at floor or ceiling levels), that the race of the face did 
not affect recognition performance overall.  Valentine and Endo (1992) also found a 
distinctiveness effect regardless of race of face; however, the overall recognition of own-race 
faces was still better than other-race faces.  On the other hand, previous research exploring the 
role of distinctiveness in the cross-race effect has utilized faces within a range of distinctiveness, 
or has not specifically examined the extremes of the distributions (e.g., Chiroro & Valentine, 
1995).  Perhaps when recognition of the most typical and most distinctive faces of each race is 
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compared the cross-race effect becomes more complex than previously thought.  The results 
cited here support this proposition.   
When an individual must recall very typical faces, performance is quite similar for other-
race and own-race faces.  There are two potential explanations for this phenomenon.  The first 
explanation relies on the relative density of these areas in the individual’s face space.  Even 
though there are fewer other-race faces overall in the face space, the very typical other-race faces 
may be densely clustered if a typicality distribution for these faces is incorporated into the face-
space.  Thus, own- and other-race typical faces will be recognized at a similar level of 
performance because they both lie in densely clustered regions of the face space.  The other 
explanation for the absence of a cross-race effect for very typical faces is that the very typical 
own- and other-race faces may be approaching a universal norm, such that they are equally 
typical in relation to this universal norm.  For example, the very typical Asian faces may be 
considered typical in relation to not only other Asian faces, but to all faces in the world.  
Therefore, these faces should be recognized with similar accuracy regardless of race.  
On the other hand, when an individual recalls highly distinctive faces, a cross-race effect 
does emerge in the opposite direction as predicted (i.e., other-race faces are recognized more 
accurately than own-race faces).  Very distinctive other-race faces are easier to remember than 
very distinctive own-race faces because there is much less competition from surrounding faces 
for the highly distinctive other-race faces.  These faces are found in the outskirts of the other-
race faces, which are already located on the perimeter of the face space.  Therefore, these faces 
are located on the very edge of the face-space and have few close neighbors to compete for 
recognition.  Thus, these faces should be recognized most accurately in a paradigm which 
compares the most and least distinctive own- and other-race faces.  The results from the current 
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study support this proposition; the highly distinctive other-race faces were recognized most 
accurately. 
Thus, the cross-race effect may be very dependent upon the distinctiveness of the faces 
tested.  The traditional cross-race effect, in which own-race faces are recognized more accurately 
than other-race faces, may be evident only for faces which fall in the mid-range of 
distinctiveness.  The cross-race effect changes as the faces reach the extremes of the 
distinctiveness distributions.  As demonstrated in the current study, faces that are very distinctive 
reverse the cross-race effect such that other-race faces are recognized more accurately than own-
race faces.  This reversal is due to the relative amount of competing faces surrounding own- and 
other-race distinctive faces.  Conversely, very typical faces tend to be typical not only of their 
own race, but for all faces in the world.  Thus, these faces are recognized with equal accuracy 
regardless of race.  As the current study is the first to report this phenomenon, future research is 
necessary to explore it in more detail.  An examination of recognition accuracy for the full range 
of distinctive faces in more than one race would be the next logical step to follow up these 
results. 
The incidental learning condition was predicted to elicit better recognition accuracy, at 
least for the five-year-old children and adults.  However, performance in the incidental and 
intentional learning conditions were overall very similar to each other.  When differences were 
found (i.e., in the percent correct and hit rate measures), participants in the intentional learning 
condition were actually more accurate than participants in the incidental learning condition.  
Previous research has shown this effect (i.e., intentional learning leading to more accurate recall 
than incidental learning) with novices and the reverse for experts.  For instance, Norman et al. 
(1989) found that novices more accurately recalled medical information when presented in an 
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intentional learning condition, while experts more accurately recalled medical information when 
presented in an incidental learning condition.  Face recognition research has typically portrayed 
adults as “experts” in face recognition, and thus the incidental learning condition should have 
elicited better recognition than the intentional learning condition.  Follow-up studies need to be 
conducted to explore the issue of intentionality to a greater degree.  The current study 
manipulated only the task instructions to allow comparison across conditions.  Perhaps greater 
differences in the methodologies are needed to obtain the predicted results.  For instance, if the 
intentional learning condition simply presented participants with a series of faces (i.e., without 
the story context) and emphasized memorization instructions (as is done in most of the previous 
face recognition studies), differential effects may be found. 
The results of the current study represent new advancements in the research on the cross-
race and distinctiveness effects.  The unique research design seems to elicit different levels of 
face recognition skills than has been found in other designs.  For instance, previous research 
suggested that the distinctiveness effect did not emerge until at least seven years of age and even 
then it was not adult-like; however, the distinctiveness effect was found very clearly and strongly 
at all ages (i.e., five years through adulthood) in the current study.  In addition, the Race x 
Distinctiveness interaction revealed a more complex role of race in face recognition than was 
previously thought.  Recognition of very typical faces is not affected by race of face, but an 
other-race bias exists for very distinctive faces.  The unique storybook format and manipulation 
of intentionality during the learning phase represent exciting new possibilities in research design 
that should be further tested in future studies. 
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2.3.1. Remaining issues 
 
The previous review of the face recognition literature identified several issues related to 
discrepancies in the developmental face recognition research.  The current study serves as a first 
step towards addressing the issues that were applicable to this investigation.  For instance, 
problems with the particular stimuli used in previous studies included distractions of hair and 
clothing cues.  Children have difficulty ignoring irrelevant cues such as clothing (Friere & Lee, 
2001) and hair is a salient cue that even newborns can use to recognize faces (Pascalis et al., 
1995).  The current study utilized pictures of faces with both the hair and clothing cues occluded.  
Participants in the current study were unable to use these cues to identify the faces.  In order to 
make these pictures seem more naturalistic, the participants were informed that they were seeing 
the individuals through a peephole in a door.  While future research needs to be conducted to 
confirm the identified stimulus issues, the current study took previous research into account 
when trying to control for extraneous factors. 
 Another methodological issue raised by the previous review was the relative demands of 
implicit and explicit tasks.  Research with infants employs implicit tasks by necessity whereas 
most research with children and adults utilize explicit tasks.  Incidental learning conditions result 
in better recognition performance for young children (e.g., Istomina, 1975; Newman, 1990) and 
experts (Norman et al., 1989).  In addition, face recognition is a skill that is automatic and 
unconscious under most circumstances.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that perhaps 
face recognition is a skill that needs to be studied under incidental learning conditions.  The 
current study compared incidental and intentional learning conditions to determine whether the 
predicted differences in recognition performance were found.  Although the current study did not 
find much evidence of differences between the incidental and intentional learning conditions, 
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future research needs to address this issue in different ways to explore potential differences 
between incidental and intentional learning tasks.  In the current study, both the incidental and 
intentional learning task were encompassed in a storybook format.  Perhaps this format made the 
intentional task more similar to an incidental task.  Perhaps if a third condition were added, in 
which the faces were presented without the context of a story, the predicted differences between 
it and the incidental design may have been strong. 
Finally, the previous review of the existing literature questioned whether the developmental 
course of face recognition skills is a linear one.  A U-shaped curve or simply development at a 
slower pace during early childhood may account for the discrepancies between the infant and 
child literatures.  As suggested earlier, future research needs to investigate the development of 
skills at multiple ages, with special attention to the under-studied preschool population.  The 
current study included older preschool-aged children and has begun to investigate the 
development of the cross-race effect at multiple time points in development.  Future research 
also needs to include the development of face recognition skills across the preschool years to 
map the developmental course in this important period.  Similarly, the cross-race effect has not 
been investigated in much detail during childhood, and there are many questions that remain 
unanswered.   The current study did not find evidence of any developmental differences in the 
cross-race effect between five years and adulthood, and face recognition performance overall 
was found to increase linearly across the age groups.  Future research, however, stills needs to 
investigate these skills at younger ages to determine whether the developmental course is truly 
linear from infancy through adulthood. 
2.3.2. Future research 
2.3.2.1. Cross-race effect.       The results from current study identified some questions about 
the cross-race effect that remain unanswered.  Previous research has addressed the role of 
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distinctiveness in the cross-race effect and found that distinctiveness affects recognition of own- 
and other-race faces.  Thus, the individual’s own-race typicality distributions are sufficient for 
the encoding of other-race faces to display some recognition advantage for other-race faces, or 
individuals have had sufficient experience with other-race faces to encode them according to 
their own typicality distributions.  The current study extended these findings to recognition of 
extremely distinctive and typical own- and other-race faces.  While previous studies have 
investigated recognition with faces along a range of distinctive values, the current study used 
only those faces at the extremes of the distribution.  As such, it was discovered that these faces 
reveal a different picture concerning the cross-race effect.  The extremely typical own- and 
other-race faces are recognized equally well, while the extremely distinctive other-race faces are 
recognized more accurately than the extremely distinctive own-race faces.  Thus, when faces are 
very typical, race appears to be irrelevant.  However, when faces are very distinctive, the cross-
race effect appears to reverse.  According to Valentine’s face space framework theory, faces in 
less densely populated regions are recognized most accurately.  If other-race faces are stored 
according to a typicality distribution, then very distinctive other-race faces should be stored in 
the least populated region of face space.  Future research needs to be conducted to confirm these 
findings.  The whole range of distinctiveness for own- and other-race faces should be compared 
in a single study in order to replicate previous cross-race effects and the current study’s finding 
of an advantage for other-races faces when very distinctive. 
 In addition, the current study actively compared recognition performance under 
incidental and intentional learning conditions with the expectation that incidental learning should 
result in increased recognition accuracy for at least the five-year-old children and the adults.  
However, only slight differences were found between the two conditions.  The procedural 
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differences between the incidental and intentional learning conditions were embedded in a 
naturalistic story and may have been too subtle for the participants.  The only difference was the 
type of information provided in the instructions prior to the task. Future studies may need to 
exaggerate these differences to truly determine whether intentionality affects face recognition 
performance.  Also, it is difficult to determine whether participants in the intentional learning 
condition were actively attempting to memorize the faces, or whether they were too involved in 
the story to evoke learning strategies.  Perhaps the storyline distracted the participants from the 
main task of memorization.  Future studies need to examine the degree of strategy use in each 
condition to ensure that the instructions are evoking different learning strategies. 
2.3.2.2. Face perception and recognition skills. A number of issues with the 
developmental face perception and recognition literature have been raised in this paper.  Each of 
the identified issues suggests the possibility of new lines of research.  Although only one of these 
lines was pursued in the current study, the reviews of the existing literature and Table 2 highlight 
several gaps that future research can address.   
For instance, the research on the development of the cross-race effect has been very 
sparse thus far.  Although the current study attempted to address the questions that this literature 
has failed to answer, future research is needed to explore the development of this skill more 
fully.  In addition, the development of the caricature effect has only been examined in middle to 
late childhood.  Also, the research on the preference for attractive faces has only been 
investigated in infancy and adulthood.  Very little is known about the developmental course of 
this preference and it should be investigated in the future.  Future research needs to continue to 
investigate these skills across the developmental span.  However, it is not only important that 
researchers fill in the gaps in the literature.  There are theoretical gaps in the research that need to  
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Table 2:  Summary of current research literature 
 
  NEWBORNS INFANTS TODDLERS & PRESCHOOLERS CHILDREN ADULTS 
PROTOTYPE 
FORMATION 
NOT YET 
DEVELOPED 
As early as 3 months, with 
a series of 4 faces 
Able to form prototypes, 
but false alarm rate 
increases from 3-6 years 
NOT YET STUDIED 
Able to form prototype 
from a series of _ faces, 
high false alarm rates to 
prototype 
RECOGNITION OF 
FAMILIAR & 
UNFAMILIAR FACES 
Recognition of 
familiar face within 
hours of birth, with 
external cues 
present 
Recognition of unfamiliar 
face by 1 month for short 
time, recognition after 2 
week delay by 6 months 
Able to remember 
unfamiliar faces for a short 
time, limited by the 
number of faces recalled 
(only 1 face for 3-year 
olds) 
Recognition of 
unfamiliar faces at 
adult-level by 10 years 
Recognition of 100’s of 
faces over very long 
period of ime (30+ 
years) 
PREFERENCE FOR 
ATTRACTIVE FACES 
Preference is 
present, may be 
supported by 
different mechanism 
Evidence of preference by 
6 months, affects social 
interactions by 12 months 
NOT YET STUDIED NOT YET STUDIED 
Consistent agreement 
among adults in 
attractiveness ratings 
CONFIGURAL 
PROCESSING NOT YET STUDIED 
Evidence of advantage for 
upright vs. inverted faces 
by 7 months 
Children 2-5 years employ 
analytic processing when 
given choice, able to 
process configurally but 
not efficient 
Children 6-11 years 
process configurally, 
still becoming more 
efficient throughout 
childhood 
Process faces in a 
configural manner 
CATEGORIZATION OF 
GENDER NOT YET STUDIED 
Categorization of most 
typical faces by 6 months 
Categorization of all faces, 
not yet at adult accuracy 
level 
NOT YET STUDIED 
100% categorization of 
most faces, faster 
reaction times for 
typical vs. less typical 
faces 
DISTINCTIVENESS 
EFFECT NOT YET STUDIED 
NOT DEVELOPED BY 10 
MONTHS 
Preliminary data suggests 
recognition advantage for 
3-4 year olds 
Recognition advantage 
for 5-13-year olds 
(reaction time), 7-13-
year olds (accuracy) 
Recognition advantage 
for distinctive vs. typical 
faces 
CROSS-RACE 
EFFECT NOT YET STUDIED 
Recognition advantage at 
3 months when single 
own-race and single other-
race face is compared 
NOT YET STUDIED 
Recognition advantage 
developed by 5th grade, 
gains strength through 
8th grade 
Recognition advantage 
for same-race vs. other-
race faces 
RECOGNITION OF 
CARICATURES NOT YET STUDIED NOT YET STUDIED NOT YET STUDIED 
Categorization and 
recognition advantage 
by 6-10-year olds 
Ability to recognize 
caricatures as well as 
their veridical depiction 
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be addressed as well.  At this time very few researchers are thinking about the development of 
face expertise in terms of advanced knowledge of feature distributions, advanced processing 
strategies, and the interaction of expert knowledge and processing strategies.   
 The discrepancies between the infancy and child research that have been discussed above 
represent important issues that future research can resolve.  The underlying reason for these 
discrepancies has yet to be determined.  Several lines of research could be undertaken to shed 
light on these causes.  For instance, there are not enough studies being conducted with preschool-
aged children.  More investigations with this population could help to clarify the developmental 
course of face expertise, identifying how it develops between infancy and childhood.  These 
studies should be designed especially to address the possible variations in the developmental 
course of face expertise, specifically a U-shaped curve in development or slowed development 
during the toddler and preschool years.   
 Future investigations also need to allow for more accurate comparisons between the 
infancy and childhood literatures.  Better control over stimulus issues and more similar tasks 
might highlight continuities across development.  Similar to Keen (2003), future studies need to 
compare face recognition performance of infants and children within the same paradigm.  Only 
then can the developmental course of face recognition skills be definitively determined. 
 In addition, the processes underlying face perception and recognition skills are of 
considerable interest to researchers (e.g., Cashon & Cohen, 2004; Schwarzer, 2000, 2002; 
Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Thompson et al., 2001).  However, essentially all of the research 
conducted on face processing has compared featural and configural processing.  Many of the 
studies suggest that infants and young children are processing faces in a more featural manner, 
whereas older children and adults process faces in a more configural manner.  The difference in 
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processing strategies between infants and children may explain the discrepancies found when 
comparing these literatures.  On the other hand, there may be additional developmental 
processing differences that have not yet been explored by researchers.  Future research should 
consider other aspects of face processing and how they change throughout development such as 
the role of distinctiveness of individual features and a potential weighting system in attention. 
In addition, future research needs to be conducted to explore the role of incidental versus 
intentional learning conditions to determine whether differences in performance can be attributed 
to this task difference.  Although no differences were found between incidental and intentional 
conditions in the current study, the differences between these conditions were very minimal.  
Future studies should exaggerate the differences between conditions to ensure that the learning 
strategies of the two groups are different.  In addition, the differences between incidental and 
intentional learning should be investigated in all areas of face recognition research.  Perhaps 
other paradigms, such as implicit memory tasks (i.e., probing memory without awareness) would 
be influenced by differences in learning conditions.  In addition, the current paradigm needs to 
be compared to more traditional paradigms that do not incorporate any storybook format to 
examine the role of intentionality more clearly.  Research such as this should help to determine 
whether the discrepant results identified in the developmental face literature could be accounted 
for by differences in the intentionality of task demands. 
Finally, several interesting questions have been raised in this paper about the 
development of processing skills, the core knowledge base of faces, and the potential interaction 
between these two.  Future research should be designed to address whether these two factors 
interact during development and the precise nature of their interaction.  Although potential 
research ideas have been posited in this paper, many others could be formulated.  For instance, a 
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simple investigation of the areas of faces that are used in face recognition and how they change 
through development might highlight the interaction of processing styles and a developing 
knowledge base.   
Research on face recognition is an important area of study and is currently an active area 
of exploration for many researchers.  This research has made important strides in our 
understanding not only of how individuals process faces, but also how individuals form 
categories, develop expertise, and attend to typicality.  Undoubtedly, the area of face recognition 
research is very large and difficult to integrate.  The current review and investigation has made 
valuable progress towards these goals.  Furthermore, this paper has highlighted several lines of 
future research that would further advance our understanding of face perception and recognition 
skills.  Together, these future research areas would clarify the development of face expertise and 
consolidate the findings into a single theoretical model.   
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